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Summary 
This study is part of  a continuing intellectual explor­
at ion o f  the concept and pro cess of development. In a nut­
shell , its bas ic assumption is that development must be 
llllderstood in terms of increasing availability of polit ical 
goods to the maj ority o f  the populat ion and the capacity o f  
that maj ority t o  contribute to their provis ion . The bulk of 
the study , therefore , is  devoted to a detailed determinat ion 
o f  t he extent of the provision of the mo st essential polit ical 
goods and the total amollllts  of financial resources mobilized 
and spent by bo th t he central government and the local 
aut horit ies, particularly in the Philippine province o f  
Negros Oriental . Not tmexpectedly , both the amollllt o f  poli­
tical goods enj oyed by t he overwhelming maj ority o f  the 
Filipinos and the ir capacity to  con tribute to their avail­
ability were very meagre . The ftmdament al caus e o f  this 
tmderdevelopment is folllld to be the stagnation of the regional 
and rural economy. For this reason, the persistent contro­
versy between the proponents of  centralization and decentral­
iz ation appears to be beside the point . The significance of 
adminis trat ive reform is also bas ically very limited.  Cl early 
rural poverty has resulted from,  and been maintained by , the 
peculiar and mutually reinforcing patterns of the polit ical 
and economic systems of the col.mtry . This fact is yet to be 
properly acknowledged even by the most thoughtful analysts . 
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Pref ace 
Like most academic effo rt s , this study grew out of dis­
sat is faction . As a polit ical s cientist , I had of course been 
primarily concerned with the work of other polit ist s . But 
being above all obsessed with the prospects  and problems o f  
development in the Third World , particularly Southeast As ia, 
I had also immersed myself in the writ ing of other social 
s cient ists , part icularly economis ts . Unhapp ily , I had found 
these readings to be  largely unhelpful. 
Undeniably ,  the notions of economic and polit ical 
development! had recently undergone significant refinement . 
Most impo rt antly , t hey had be come less rigidly exclus ive in 
dis ciplinary t erms and less blatant ly West-centri c .  Never­
theless ,  they had remained in my view essent ially narrow and 
t imid .  
Most  o f  the polit ists who regarded themselves as being 
concerned with development had actually fo cused their 2 att ent ion on the pro cess o f  modernization o r  social change . 
At any rat e ,  too many had been quite conten t  with con centrating 
on the polit ical aspects and implicat ions of social and 
cult ural structures and ins titut ions as such . Since these 
are obviously very slow-changing , their conclus ions could 
always be couched either in terms of very long-range and 
necessarily slow , even imperceptible , changes or as declar­
at ions  of despair at the seemingly insurmotmtable social 
and cultural barriers and obs tacles . In eithe r cas e ,  they 
conveniently absolved political leaders of any real respon s­
ib ility for t aking resolute action .  
1As I have argued elsewhere (Nawawi 19 76a) development 
should be conceived primarily in economic and polit ical 
terms . This does not , however ,  deny the importance of 
social and cultural variables . 
2The neces sary dis t in ct ion b etween development and modern­
ization has also been put forth in Nawawi (19 76a) . 
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As fo r the development economist s ,  many had s imply 
con tin ued to t ake the position of either dismi s s ing any 
polit ical implicat ion of their analyses or taking it for 
granted that any necessary polit ical act ion should be more 
or les s  painlessly forthcomin g .  Even the few who had begllll. 
to show serious appreciat ion o f  non-economic f actors deter­
mining the pro spect of  economic development had shrunk from 
int egrally including these factors , part icularly the polit ical 
ones , in their reco11DI1endat ions . 
What seemed to be  very badly needed was a concept ion 
of development which would neces s it ate t aking int o  accotmt 
both polit ical and economic criteria inseparably . In the 
condit ions pertaining in developing collll.t ries , it seemed 
coy for the e conomist s  and irresponsible for the polit ical 
s cient ist s  to continue to plough their own respective f ields . 
Development should at once be  economic and polit ical .  
In cons iderin g  some o f  the mos t  recent not ions o f  the 
goal of developmen t and searching the history of polit ical 
philo sophy , one idea emerged as most  p romis in g .  This is 
that the primary if not the only reason for social living 
is the tmique possibility it offers to those participat ing 
in it for the realizat ion o f  their human pot ent ial . In the 
context of a nation , this means that development requires 
the ut ilizat ion of all national human and non-human resources 
for the benefit , and through the act ive participat ion , o f  
the greatest maj ority of  t h e  cit izens . More concretely , the 
maj ority of citizens must be act ively involved in the pro­
duction and enj oyment of nat ional wealth . Any nat ion which 
does not make it possible for any sub stantial se gment of it s 
cit izenry t o  be product ive and to share equit ably the avail­
ab le n at ional resources cannot be regarded as developed . A 
nation is developing only if more and mo re o f  its citiz en s  
are b ecoming more and more act ively involved in the creat ion 
and enj oyment o f  its achievement s .  
The mos t  convenient way to operat ionalize this concept 
of development seemed to be to fo cus on the provis ion of 
polit ical goods and the mobilizat ion of resour ces necessary 
for it . A polit ical good can simply b e  defined as any good, 
s uch as public health , which is impos s ib le or extremely 
inconvenient to ob tain or to provide individually and part ic­
ularist ically . Such goods are polit ical sin ce the need for 
them and their availability are necessar ily the result and 
reward of social living , that is living in a polity . For 
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this reason , their provision and the access to them directly 
define one aspect of  active social participation . Contribut ing 
t o  their product ion const itutes the other aspect . 
Because of this fo cus on polit ical goods , it is appro­
priate and convenient to describe  the concept as polit ical 
development . Clearly the use of the term ' polit ical' here 
is much broader than the conventional usage . Nevertheless , 
as it is essen tially only a return to the original Greek 
notion , it should be meaningful even convent ionally . At the 
same t ime , it should not be too alien to convent ional econo­
mis ts . After all , the concept o f  polit ical good is almost 
iden tical with tha t  of  public or governmen t good . 
The principal operat ional difficulty with the suggested 
approach concerns the ident ificat ion and measurement of 
polit ical goods . The presen t  study aims to clarify and 
resolve some o f  the problems . It is thus int ended not only 
as a case study of a particular area or society but also as 
a con t inuing intellectual exp lorat ion . 3 
The fo cus of this study is the province of Negros Oriental , 
one o f  the two provinces on the island of Negros in the 
central Visayas region of the Philippines . All the original 
data presented in the following chapt ers were gathered in the 
field b etween July 19 72 and June 19 7 3  while I served as a 
Visit ing Professor at Silliman University in Dumaguete City , 
the provincial capit al . They were obt ained by mys elf and my 
assis t ants either directly from the official records and 
p ersonal observation or from interviews with relevant officials 
and individuals . 
3The result of  my f irst att empt t o  use the concept , in 
Indones ia, has b een partially presented in Nawawi (197 3) . 
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Chapter 1 
The set t ing 
The administ rative structure 
An archipelago of more than 7000 islands , the Philippines 
covers a land area of only about 300 , 000 square kilometres . 
This f act helps to explain a distinct ive feature of the 
Repub lic's adminis t rat i ve structure . Unlike the Indones ians , 
the Filipinos , who are only about one-third as numerous , are 
living in more than twice as many provinces. There were at 
the t ime of thi s  s tudy seventy p ro vinces which in turn 
contained more than 6000 mtmicipalit ies and cit ies and almost 
30 , 000 barrios ( Corpuz , 19 71 : 24 ) . These provinces were 
grouped into ten regions , the location , populat ion , and land 
areas of which may be seen in Table 1 . 1 . 
Regions I to  VI , containing 5 3  per cent of the populat ion 
and co vering 48  per cent o f  the land area,  are either on 
Luzon or are iden t ifiab le with it , making the island pre­
eminent of the three main divisions of the archipelago . The 
Visayas and Mindanao , consis t ing o f  two regions each , co ver 
18 per cent an d  34 per cent o f  the land area and 2 5  per cent 
and 23 per cent  o f  the total population respect ively . 
In addit ion to the pro vinces , cities and municipalit ies , 
there were other local units called sub-pro vinces and muni­
cipal dist ricts .  Numb ering s ix and about fifty respectively 
in 196 5 ,  thes e were 'areas whi ch do not have adequate resources 
to exist independently and are usually inhabited by cultural 
minor it ies' - ( Ocampo , 19 69 : 438) . The city was supposed to be 
distinguished from the municipality chiefly by the size and 
degree of concent rat ion of populat ion and the level o f  income . 
But this was not always the case . S ince a chart ered city was 
administrat i vely equivalent to a pro vince and thus had more 
taxing powers than a mtmicipality which was also required to 
share some of its revenues with the province , its creat ion 
was somet imes largely t he  result of polit i cal manoeuvrin g .  
1 
2 
Table 1 . 1  
Phili_e_eine regions 
No . of Population Area Des ignation/Location Prov-. 
inces 1970 (sq. km) 
Region I :  Manila and suburb s 1 1 , 32 3 , 430 1 , 883 
Region II : !locos Valley and 
Motmtain Provinces 8 1 , 82 9 , 5 3 7  2 5 , 766  
Region III : Cagayan Valley and 
Batanes 4 1 , 461 , 404 2 6 , 838 
Region IV: Central Luzon 7 5 , 09 4 , 384 2 3 , 646 
Region V :  Southern Luzon and 
is lands 9 6 , 790 , 702 46 , 092  
Region VI : Bicol and Masbate 6 2 , 9 64 , 432 1 7 , 633  
Region VI I :  Western Visayas 6 3 , 76 7 , 213  2 1 , 5 7 9  
Region VII I :  Eastern Vi say as 8 5 , 408 , 549 32 ' 046 
Region I X :  Northern Mindanao 10 3 , 011 , 903 39 , 845 
Region X:  South Mindanao 
and Sulu 8 4 , 938 , 514 62 , 154 
Total 6 7  36 , 5 90 , 068 2 9 7 , 382 
Note : The tot al number of p rovinces was as o f  the date o f  
the census ; three sub-provinces have attained full 
provincial status s ince then . Manila and suburbs may 
not be re garded as a province proper . 
Sources : BCS ( 19 70) and LGC ( 19 73 ) . 
Although the Philippines was generally regarded as 
highly cent ralize d ,  the provincial chief executives - the 
governors - were not appointed by Man ila but were popularly 
elect ed local f igures . Likewise , the vice-governors as well 
as the city and mtmicipal mayors and the ir deput ies were 
dependent on local vo ters . Each province , city , municipal ity 
and barrio also featured a popularly elected assembly , board 
or council . The chairman o f  the barrio council was designated 
as the barrio capt ain . 
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Negros Oriental 
The province of Negros Oriental covers the south and 
southeastern part of the Visayan island of Negros , sharing 
it with Negros Occidental . The line between these two 
provin ces constitutes the only land bo\llldary b etween Eastern 
and Western Visayas . 
Tab le i. 2 
Negros Oriental in comparat ive p erspective 
Philippines Median Province a 
Negros Orientalb 
rank 
Populationc 36 , 590 , 068 
Land area 
( sq . km) C 2 9 7 , 382 
Population 
density 
( sq . km) c 12 3 
Urb an populat ion 
(% 19 7o) d 14 
Housing material : 
strong/ mixed ( % ) e 56  
Inhab itants per 
motor vehiclef 76 
389 , 590  715 , 2 40 
3 , 794 5 , 746  
124 1 25 
30 12 
60 3 3  
15 7 12 8 
a Con s idering only full provinces exist ing in 1970 , 
excluding Manila . 
1 6th 
1 8th 
32n d  
58th 
62nd 
2 7th 
b All the figures are for the full province , including the 
sub-provin ce of Sequij or . 
c LGC ( 19 73) . 
d The f igure for the Philippines as a whole comes from Tanco 
( 1 9 70 : 100) . The other figures have been taken from B CS 
( 19 70 :  Tab le 2 ) . 
e BCS ( 19 70 : Table 10 ) . Brick and wood are class ified as 
strong while light building materials include nipa , b amboo 
an d  grass . ' Mixed ' therefore refers to mixture of strong 
and l ight material s .  
f JPS ( 19 7l : Table 5 . 8 , p . 4 9 ) . 
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Table 1 . 2  compares Negros Oriental with the other pro­
vinces .  In terms of it s population and land area , the pro­
vince ranked quit e high ,  being the 16th and 18th largest 
province respect ively , excluding Manila. It s populat ion was 
actually one-third more than the nat ional provincial average . 
In terms of population den s ity , however ,  it s rank was only 
j ust  above that o f  the median province . In fact , it had 
almost exactly the same dens ity as the median province and 
the same numb er o f  persons per square kilometre as the 
Philippines as a whole . 
It is in terms o f  economic development that Negros 
Oriental differed s igni ficantly from most o f  the other pro­
vin ces and the country as a whole . It was at the lower end 
of the spectrum with re gard to the level of urbanizat ion and 
the quality of housing . Evidently most of  the inhabitants 
of the provin ce were poorer than most other Fil ipino s ,  although 
the rich few , thanks perhaps to the sugar indust ry in the 
province , were equally capable of affording the luxury of 
owning and us ing motorized vehicles as the ir counterpart s 
elsewhere . 
Dumaguet e ,  the provincial capital , is also the only 
really urban centre in the province . It s populat ion o f  
52 , 000 in 19 70 was signif ican tly larger than those of the 
othe r two chartered cit ies in the province , Bais and Canl aon , 
which had 40 , 095 an d  2 3 , 59 8  inhab itants respect ively . More­
over , Dumaguete ' s  larger population is concentrated i� a much 
smaller area so that· its density of 9 32 persons per s quare 
kilomet re was mo re than s ix t imes that o f  either of the other 
two cit ies (LGC , 1 9 7 3 ) . In fact , Bais and Canlaon were really 
little more than rural market towns whose claim to city status 
was largely b ased on their relatively large revenues derived 
from their sugar refineries and the surrounding sugarcane 
plan tat ions . Of the two , Bais , which is only about 80 km 
from Dumaguete , was certainly the more impo rt an t . Made a 
city in 19 6 8 ,  it was the richest lo cal government unit in 
Negros Oriental . 
Aside from the three chartered cit ies an d  directly under 
the provincial government of Negros Oriental were twenty-two 
municipalit ies . As Tab le 1 . 3  shows , these unit s  varied quite 
signi ficantly both in populat ion and land area . Tanj ay and 
Bacong, the two municipalit ies chosen ,  represent ed the opposit e  
ends of the spectrum .  The former was generally regarded as 
the most progress ive municipality ,  boast ing not only o f  
enj oying the greatest concentration of  profess ionals and 
6 
Tab le 1 . 3 
The municiEalities o f  Negros Oriental : 
their areas , poEulations and classifications 
Area (ha) �opulation (19 70)  Class (19 7 3 )  
a 
Amlan 5 , 9 35 11 , 54 7  4th 
Ayungon 15 , 36 3 2 3 , 165 4th 
Bacong 2 , 5 00 12 , 065 5th 
Basay 34 , 35 3  8 , 2 3 3 6th 
Bayawan 9 6 , 02 4  44 , 615 3rd 
Bindoy 1 7 , 36 8  18 , 334 4th 
Dauin 11 , 406 13 , 5 33 4th 
Guihulngan 33 , 76 7  7 2  ' 9 69 lst ( 6 )  
Jimalalud 13 , 948  18 , 56 8  4th 
La Lib ertad 13 ' 9 6 4  2 9 , 693 3rd 
Mab inay 14 , 25 7  33 , 785 4th 
Manj uyod 2 6 , 459  2 0 , 545 4th 
Pamplona 2 0 , 2 19 2 0 , 541 3rd 
San Jos e  5 , 444 8 , 840 5th 
Sta Catalina 52 , 314 39 , 601 4th 
Sia ton 33 , 59 3  2 6 , 9 6 3  4th 
Sib ulan 16 , 29 9  16 , 861 4th 
Tanj ay 53 , 92 5  51 , 45 8  lst ( 5 )  
Tay as an 15 , 419 2 0 , 1 32 4th 
Valencia 14 , 834 13 , 318  4th 
Vallehe rmoso 15 , 29 4  2 0 , 418  4th 
Zamboangita 8 554 11 , 3 85 4th 
Total 5212239 536,569 
a On the b as is of  their average publ ic revenues during the two 
preceding years , municipalities were classif ied into seven 
clas ses . First- class municipalities were further sub-divided 
into s ix grades .  Thus Guihulngan and Tanj ay were grade 6 
and grade 5 first-class municipalities respectively . 
Source : Provincial Statistical Office , Dumaguete City . 
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other highly educated individuals but also of  b eing the most  
fert ile breeding ground o f  such persons  in the province . 
Although one of  the oldest settlement s  in the area and the 
closest to Dumaguete , Bacong , on the othe r  hand , was one o f  
the most backward lo calities .  Such cont rast reflected 
dramat ically different economic condit ion s .  As indicated by 
it s f irst-class s t atus , Tanj ay was actually the wealthiest 
township in Negros Oriental , while fifth-class Bacong was 
tmquest ionably one o f  the poo rest muni cipalit ie s . 
Chapt er 2 
The provision of polit ical goods 
It is neither possib le nor necessary to specify all the 
types of goods which should be regarded as pub lic or poli­
tical . Some polit ical goods also seem to be b et t er indicators 
than others of the ext ent of  governmental performance and 
polit ical development . The four polit ical goods chosen for 
discuss ion below - pub lic educat ion , pub lic health , j us t ice 
and pub lic securit y ,  and pub lic transportation and commun i­
cation - seem to be the most essential and indicat ive . 
Pub lic educat ion 
Of the three levels of educat ion , the primary is most 
clearly political . Unlike secondary and tertiary educat ion , 
primary educat ion is necessarily , because of its nature , at 
least predominan tly pub lic . The degree o f  pub lic monopoly 
in the provision of primary education is of course variable . 
In the Philipp ines , the government shares the responsibility 
with private , largely religious , initiative to a far greater 
exten t  than anywhere else in Southeast Asia.  Nevertheless , 
bas ic education in the Philippines is s t ill predominantly in 
the hands of the pub lic authority . 
In Negros Orien tal as a who le , there were , for the 
197 2 - 7 3  school year , 507 pub lic primary and elemen tary 
schools . Considering the province ' s  land area of 5 7 46 square 
kilometres , very few children of s choo l-going age were thus 
likely to be out of school s imply b ecaus e of  distance . Both 
in terms of the average teacher-student rat io and the average 
number of students per classroom,  the provis ion of primary 
education in the province also seemed to b e  gen erally adequate .  
The 113 , 72 5  studen t s  go ing t o  these schools were taught by 
3795  teachers in 35 02 classrooms . 
Rather unexpectedly , the performance of  Dumaguete was 
no better than that of the provin ce as a whole . For its 11 
pub li c  p rimary and elementary schools , the city had 2 86 
8 
9 
teachers teaching a to tal of 7 9 88 students in 224 class rooms. 
This means that on the average there were only about 2 8  
studen ts for every teacher in the capital , as compared t o  30 
in the province generally. On the other hand , the city had 
to put 36 inst ead of 32 students in an average class room. 
Tanj ay not surprisingly outperformed both the province 
and the capital city. Fo r it s 85 4 7  student s ,  the municipality 
had 25 schools , 334 teachers and 2 7 6  classrooms , making the 
average numb ers of students per teacher and per class room 
only about 2 6  and 31 respectively. In spit e of it s low level 
of economic development , Bacon g ,  with 93 teachers for its 
2 336 students , had an even lower student-teacher rat io of 25 
to one. Since it  had only 9 schools con taining a total of 
only 54 classrooms , however ,  it was forced to crowd an 
average of 43  students in each classroom. 
The dis crepancy b etween Bacong ' s  and Tanj ay ' s  relative 
studen t-teacher ratios on the one hand and their relative 
economic positions on the other reflect s the fact that , as 
municipal teachers are dire ctly and ent ir ely paid by the 
central governmen t , the number of teachers in a municipality 
is not dependen t on the economi c capability of that muni­
cipality. The case is only a bit dif feren t  for a city. 
Although the cen t ral Min istry of Educat ion was st ill fully 
in charge of a city ' s  primary and elemen tary schools , the 
city government was required to contribute to the paymen t of  
some of  it s teachers. Hence , Dumaguete was financially 
respon s ible for about a quarter of the city teachers in the 
19 72-7 3 schoo l year. School buildings and classrooms in the 
municipalities as well as cit ies were also mostly the respons­
ib ility of the central government. For this reason , their 
quality was also a poor indicator of the level of economic 
prosperity in these localities. While 7 7  per cen t  of the 
classrooms in Bacong were of p ermanent or semi-permanent 
construction , only 64 per cent of tho se in Tanj ay were. The 
greater crowding in Bacong ' s  s chools may simply reflect the 
much greater population density in the municipality. 
The dominant role of  the central Ministry of Educat ion 
clearly prevented blatan t  educat ional dispar it ies among the 
cit ies and municipalities. Nevertheless , there were signifi­
cant ,  albeit subtle , qualitative dif ferences. It was a 
generPlly accepted fact that schools in the cit ies and the 
richer mtlllicipalit ies had the b est  teachers. Since unqualified 
teachers were generally classified as provis ional , it is 
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revealing to no te the p ercentages of such teachers . In 
Bacong , almo st half of the teachers were provis ional . 
Although the exact figure was not available for Tanj ay , the 
percentage app eared to be much lower there . In Dumaguete , 
the p rovis ional teachers accotm ted for less than 13 per cent 
of the teaching staf f  in the primary and elementary schools . 
In areas where local financial responsib ility was involved , 
disparities were also no table . Tanj ay ' s  schoo ls appeared 
to be much better maintained , for example , than tho se in 
Bacong.  Facilities such as librar ies and workshops were 
comparab le in number in the two municipalities ; to Bacong ' s  
three libraries and five indust rial arts and home economics 
workshops Tanj ay had five and twelve re spectively . These 
facilities , however , we re not iceably better equipped and 
managed in the lat ter , richer township . 
Pub lic health 
The mos t  obvious aspect of public health is of course 
the availab ility of health-care facilit ies and p ersonnel . 
In addit ion , the provis ion o f  pub lic health must include two 
other aspect s .  As ide from programs o f  disease preven tion 
and control , there must  exis t facilities for public sanitat ion , 
no tably the means of  waste disposal and the sources of safe 
drinking water . 
In the entire provin ce o f  Negro s Oriental ,  there were 
(July 197 3)  only three pub lic hospitals . The main provincial 
hospit al , located in Dumaguete , served as the central unit 
to  whi ch all serious medical cases were ref erred from all over 
the province . With a capacity o f  12 5 beds , it was served by 
18 doctors and 45 nurses and other qualified medical p ersonnel . 
As a full gene ral hospital , it was equipped with departments 
of surgery , ob stetrics and gynaecology , and pediatrics , and 
provided dietary , laboratory , x-ray , den tal , nursing and 
dispens ary services . The two othe r public hospitals , located 
at the oppos ite ends of the province - at Bayawan and 
Guihulngan - were much smaller branches of the central unit . 
In addit ion to these three hospi tals an d  a provincial TB 
control cen tre in Dumaguete , there were in the whole province 
out side the cit ies 48 pub lic clinics and barrio health-cen t res  
served by  a total of  23 doctors , 7 dent ists , 26  nurses, 49 
midwives and 35 sanitary inspect ors . As suming a rate of  
population increase of 3 per  cent a year , since the last 
census of 1970 , there were in 1973,  therefore , about 2 0 , 000 
and 7 700 rural inhabitants respectively for each public doctor/ 
den t is t  and each nurse /midwife in the province . 
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Unfortunately province-wide data on the two other 
aspec t s  of public health specified above were not readily 
obtainab le .  The following informat ion for Dumaguete , Tanj ay 
and Bacong shou�d, however ,  be sufficiently indicat ive of  
the situat ion in the province as  a whole . In fact , only a 
closer look at the condit ions in the smaller units could 
give an adequate descript ion of  the exten t  to which this 
political good was being provided . 
Dumaguete had only two doctors , one of whom also acted 
as the city health officer . Although the po sit ion was provided 
for in the 19 72- 7 3  budget , there was at that t ime no public 
dentist in the city . In addit ion to the two physicians , 
there were three nurses and four midwives serving the city ' s  
one general clinic and a pueroculture (baby-care) unit in 
the pob lacion or city-cen tre and 13 barrio health centres . 
These barrio cen tres were very modest affairs , each run by 
a midwife who vis it ed it about once a week . Even the general 
clinic was rather unimpressive . Sharing a two-storey building 
with the off ices of the city asses sor , city auditor , city 
fis cal and city j udge , it dispensed its varied services from 
three small rooms , one of which als o  served as the adminis­
trative office of the health officer . As ide from the shortage 
of p ersonnel , there was an openly admitted inadequacy of 
equipment and medicine . The latter was supposed to be 
dispensed free of  charge but very often was simply unavailable . 
Accordin g  to the records in the office o f  the health officer , 
the city ' s  health service received less than US$1500 worth 
of medicine annually. for the 19 70-71  and 19 71-72 fis cal y ears . 
The two public di sease prevention and control programs 
which appeared to be actually operat ional in t he city were 
the anti-malaria drive and the vaccinat ion against tubercu­
los is , small-pox , diphtheria and cholera .  Primarily directed 
toward s chool children , the immunizat ion s ervice was also 
readily available to  the general public and was claimed to 
be well-prepared to meet emergency outbreaks of  these appar­
ently s till prevalent diseases . Other pro grams seemed to be 
inactive largely as the result of their dependence on out side 
sources of funding . The medicine for the contro l  of  tuber­
culosis , for example , was provided entirely by Manila which 
in turn was partly dependent on the UNICEF . The UN agency 
was also the source o f  funding for a short-lived experimental 
program in the public schools which b enefit ed only thirty 
pupils for three mon ths . 
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Except for a sect ion of the pob lacion, Dumaguete com­
pletely lacked a public sewage disposal syst em.  Indeed , the 
city was badly in need of adequate drainage . Int erestin gly , 
much of the drainage alon g the main thoroughfare in the 
centre of the city had been built not by the city government 
but by the comp et ing Lions and Ro tary club s . To clean its 
s treet s ,  parks , publi c market and slaughterhouse, an d  to 
collect it s refuse , the city employed a total of  21 sweepers 
and 18 garbage collectors . 
The unavailability of  suitab le drinking water was often 
directly related to improper was te disposal ar..d was a serious 
threat to public health . In Dumaguete , only the pob lacion 
and pa rts of  some barrios along the main s treets  were served 
with piped water from the city ' s  waterworks . According to  
the Waterworks Department , there were in to tal only 2 061 water 
connec tion s  in the entire city . Apparently no improvement 
in the waterworks sy stem had b een made since 1960 when the 
census revealed that of the city ' s  5657  occupied dwelling 
unit s ,  only 3202 were provided wi th piped water (Bureau of 
the Census and Statist ics , 1960 ) .  It was als o  found then 
that o f  the remaining dwellings , only 407  were supplied with 
drinking water from artesian wells . 
In terms of health-care faciliti es and personnel , Tanj ay 
and Bacong were comparable t o  the provincial cap ital . Indeed , 
Tanj ay had one more general clinic than Dumaguete and the 
same number of doctors , nurses and midwives . For its 15 
barrios, however , the municipality had only one barrio health 
centre . In Bacong , one clinic and one barrio health cen tre 
were served by one doctor , two midwives and one nurse . As 
in Dumaguet e ,  the mo st urgent need in these two municipalities 
was for more adequate equipment and medicine . Bacong ' s  clinic , 
for example , did not have a microscope and was equipped only 
with a small refrigerator for the storage of vaccines .  Under 
this circumst ance , the clinics , let alone the barrio centres , 
were only capab le of attending to very minor medical needs . 
Both Tanj ay and Bacong also seemed to have a funct ioning 
innnunizat ion program for the school children and the general 
public . Aside from this , the only other disease prevent ion 
service giving an impression of being at all available was 
malaria contro l .  The other programs concerned with the 
control of venereal diseases , leprosy , yaws , tuberculosis , 
etc . were often mentioned but appeared to be  inact ive . 
13 
Neithe r municipality was served by a public sewerage 
sy stem or adequate drainage . It is noteworthy , however ,  that 
both lo calities had actively part icipated in the nat ion-wide 
water-sealed to ilet con struct ion campaign , claiming almo st 
to tal success in eliminat ing the use of less des irable 
facilities . Unfortunately , the inadequacy of reliable drinking 
water was an acute problem in the municipalities . In Bacong , 
a decrepit waterworks system laid out in 19 26 was serving 
only 42 per cent of the population living in twelve of the 
twenty two barrios . With another 40 per cent o f  the population 
served by ar tes ian wells , the township contained five barrios 
with 18 per cent of  the populat ion lacking any dependable 
source of clean drinking water . In additional to the town 
centre , only two barrios in Tanj ay were supplied with water 
from the waterworks . Of the o ther twelve barrios, only three 
could depend entirely on the relativ�ly safe artesian wells� 
One barrio simply had no adequate  wat er supply . 
Like public educat ion , public health was to a great 
exten t  the respon sibility of the central government . All the 
medicines and medical equipment and supplies for the city 
and municipal clinics and health centres came directly and 
indirectly from Manila. In the case of the municipalities , 
almo st all t he medical salaries also came from the same source .  
Aside from having s ome o f  i t s  medical personnel paid by 
Manila , the province was also dependen t  on the central govern­
ment for part of the operat ing cos t  of the provincial hospitals . 
Programs for the p revent ion and control o f  public and connnuni­
cable diseases were .in large measure run by the various 
agencies of  the central Minis try of  Health . Finally , the 
ass istance uf the central government was required to provide 
the infrast ructure of public s anitat ion . 
As in the case of  public educat ion , the maj or role 
assumed by the central government had undoubtedly insured a 
rough equality in the level o f  the provis ion of public health 
in the province . However ,  this involvement had not been 
successful in the achievement o f  a comparab le standard of  
adequacy. As reflected in the data presented above, the 
provis ion of  public health in Negros Oriental was relatively 
much less satis factory than that of public primary and 
elementary educat ion . The con t inuing prevalence of  such 
diseases as cholera and tuberculos is unders cored the general 
dirtines s of the cit ies and municipal centres . In this 
generally arid region , the inadequacy of the public waterworks 
sys tems posed not only a serious hazard to public health but 
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also caus ed a real hardship to a sub st antial segmen t of the 
populat ion. One reason fo r this state o f  affairs was the 
obvious ly greater complexity of issues and needs connected 
with public health in comparison with those o f  educat ion. 
The mor e  numerous and the more varied problems required 
relat ively greater capability on the part of the local 
governments themselves , not  only in terms of adminis trative 
co-ordinat ion but also with regard to supplementary ftmding. 
Jus t ice and pub lic security 
The resolution of  conflict s has long b een considered 
the cent ral concern of politi cs. It has also b ecome part of  
the folklore of polit ics that at  the heart o f  any succes sful 
conflict resolut ion is the vindi cation of the sense o f  j ustice. 
Hence , the administ ration of j us t ice has always been one of 
the mo st crucial polit ical goods. Clo sely related to and 
almos t inseparable from the promot ion of j ust ice is the 
maintenance of security. As j ust ice would be o f  little value 
wi thout security , security without j ustice is a farce. The 
dif ficulty is to measure the exten t  of the availab ility o f  
either of these elusive goods. I n  the absence of more satis­
factory means of evaluation , the followin g di scuss ion has to 
confine itself to the conventional indicators : the j udi ciary 
and the police. 
The two Negros provinces const itut ed one of the s ixt een 
j udicial dist ricts into which the Philippines was divided. 
In Negros Oriental , the Court of the First Inst an ce , the 
highest  court in each j udicial district , organized it self 
for conven ience into five b ranches. Located permanent ly in 
Dumaguet e ,  three branches covered both the cities o f  Dumaguete 
and Bais as well as eleven municipalities clo sest to the 
provin cial capital. The two other b ran ches , recen t ly estab ­
lished , were t emporarily operating from Dumaguete in the 
abs ence of suit able court houses in their respective areas 
in the opposite ends of the province. In addit ion , there was 
also in Dumaguete the provincial Court of Agrarian Relat ions. 
Underneath the CFI were the city and municipal courts  which 
were found in all cit ies and mun icipalt ies. In total , the 
province was served by six provincial , four city and twenty­
one municipal j udges. While the cities of Bais and Canlaon 
had only one j udge each , the provincial capital had an extra 
j udge for its spe cial criminal ,  j uvenile and domestic relat ions 
court . There were twenty-two municipalities and municipal 
court s  but Bacong and Dauin shared the s ervices of a s in gle 
j udge. 
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The set-up of  the Court of the First Instance was 
paralleled to some ext ent by the organiz at ion of the office 
o f  the provincial fis cal or  attorney. In addit ion to the 
chief fis cal , there were seven as sis t an t  provin cial fiscals 
assigned to the di fferen t  branches of the CFI. However , 
while all the cit ies and mun icipalit ies , except Bacong and 
Dauin , were provided with their own j udges , only the cit ies 
had the special servi ces of the prosecut ing atto rneys. In 
the municipalities , some o f  the duties of  the pub lic pro se­
cutors were performed b y  the chiefs of police. 
In terms of the numb er of courts , the people of the 
provin ce seemed to be well provided for. The provincial 
j udicial service suffered , however ,  from two maj or defici­
encies. A main complaint o f  the j udges and the fi scals was 
the inadequacy of the support ing p ersonnel. To assist the 
branche s , there was a central CFI clerk-of-court o ffice in 
Dumaguete which , in addit ion to the clerk-of-court and his 
deputy , only employed three clerks and a process server. At 
each CFI branch the j udge was assisted by a branch clerk-of­
court , an interp reter ( to t ranslate English as the language 
of the court into the local dialect and vic.e versa) , and two 
or three stenographers. In addit ion , two branches also 
employed a bailiff and two ordinary clerks each. As ide from 
the chief clerk , the of fice of  the provinc ial attorney was 
staffed only by three stenographers and two clerks. The other 
maj or source of dif ficulty was the shortage of equipment 
( e. g. typewriters) and supplies. Interest ingly , an almo st 
invariable source of . dissat isfact ion was the lack of law 
books for referen ce. 
In view of these inadequacies , it is not surprising 
that there was a substan t ial backlo g. The j udges est imated 
that while there were abou t eighty cases filed in the five 
branches of the CFI every mon th , only about three-quarters 
of them could be disposed of. One branch j udge admitted that 
he had 224  cases pending in his court alone. 
With two courts and a prosecutor ' s  office of their own , 
the people of  Dumaguete probably enj oyed the b est j udicial 
service in the provin ce. In terms of pers onnel , the city ' s  
courts and at torney ' s  office were comparable to any of the 
CFI b ran ches and the off ice of the provincial fiscal. Each 
of the two city j udges was assisted by a clerk-of-court and 
a steno grapher. Addit ionally , the regular court had an 
interpr eter while the criminal , j uvenile and domestic relations 
court employed another steno grapher. Ass ist ing the city 
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fis cal were three ass ist ant prosecutors , two clerks and a 
stenographer . An obvious problem faced by the city ' s  courts 
was a lack o f  office and courtroom space . As has b een noted 
earl ier , the city court shared a building not only with the 
of fice of the fiscal but also with the city health office 
cum clinic as well as the offices of the city assessor and 
auditor . The criminal , j uvenile and domestic relat ion s court 
had it s personnel tucked in to a small room at the' city hall 
between the mayor ' s  of fice an d the office o f  the city council , 
and us ed the lat ter ' s  as semb ly hall as it s courtroom. 
On the average , it is estimat ed that about 450 cases a 
y ear were filed in Dumaguete ' s  two court s .  Although no firm 
official est imate of the vo lume of  the backlog was ob tainable , 
it seemed that only a rather small number of  cases were added 
to it every year . The last available of ficial report revealed 
that at the end of 19 7 0 ,  j ust before the establishment o f  
the special criminal , j uvenile and domestic relat ions court , 
the backlog covered 2 85 cases (Negros Express, 9/1/ 7 1 : 1 ) . 
More indicat ive o f  the level of  the provis ion of  j udicial 
service in the provin ce was the per formance of the j udiciary 
in Bacong and Tanj ay . Bes ides the j udge whom it shared with 
the neighbouring mun icipality of Dauin , Bacong was completely 
lackin g in j udicial personnel . Availab le only one morn ing 
and one afternoon a week and admitt edly without law b ooks 
for reference , the j udge s in gle-handedly received four to 
five cases a month and succeeded in dispos ing three to four 
cases . In Tanj ay , whe re about twen ty cases were f iled 
monthly , a full-time j udge and a clerk were able to handle 
about three-fourths of the load . 
Being a purely local service , the police had no pro­
vincial st ructure . Instead , the Negros Oriental constabulary 
(milit ary) command also exercised supervis ion over the separate 
city and municipal police fo rces which were seriously def i­
cien t both in personnel and equipment . Although the provincial 
commander was unwilling to provide an accurate count of the 
number of policemen available in the province ,  he was quite 
emphatic in declaring the service to be un dermanned . Making 
a similar observat ion , a newspaper report in May 19 72 
addit ionally alleged that the police forces in the province 
lacked not only adequat e means to  con tro l illegal fishing 
and smuggling and ' to repel pirate raids ' but also ammunit ions 
for side-arms (Negros Examiner, 31/5/ 72 : 1) . 
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The Dumaguete police department clearly illus trated 
these deficiencies . With a to tal o f  seventy-five men and 
officers , the force was actually limit ing its attent ion almost 
exclusively to the pobZacion . The department est imated that , 
to ext end its prot ect ion to the barrios, it would have to 
expand by at least two-thirds of  its present st rength . Owing 
to  this lack of personnel , the force was also do ing without 
any special service either for traf fic control or detect ion . 
Even with its current establishment , the department lacked 
an adequate supply of equipment ; it was revealed , for inst ance , 
that the curren t  seventy-five memb ers of the force had to 
share fifty-nine pieces o f  s idearms . 
Tanj ay ' s  police department was somewhat more adequate . 
Bes ides operat ing two barrio sub-s tat ions , it maint ained 
special t raf fic and detection sections . With only forty­
three men and six officers , however , the force could not 
really carry out these services very effectively , particularly 
in view of the fact that it also ran the fire department . 
Understandably ,  the chief insisted that he needed at least 
eight more men . In po ssess ion of only thirty-s ix sidearms , 
three rifles and two sub-machine guns , the department was also 
in need of more weapons . 
In addit ion to  the chief , Bacong's police force consisted 
only of one private first class , one fully qual ified patrolman 
and six other men . Even fully armed , such a small contingent 
would still not be able to provide minimally satis factory 
police protect ion much b eyond the pobZacion . In fact , the 
force was only equipped with one sub-machinegun borrowed from 
the provincial constabulary , one shot-gun and three revolvers . 
Fort tmately the memb ers of the force did not have to double 
as firemen . 
The dat a presented above should suffice to  illustrate 
the generally unsatisfactory extent of the provision of j ust ice 
and security in the province . Moreover ,  they tend to indicate 
that between these two polit ical goods , the lat ter was somewhat 
scarcer than the former which also seemed to be more evenly 
dist ributed,  at least among the municipalit ies . This finding 
strengthened the earlier impression that both the degree o f  
availabil ity o f  the political goods an d  the evenness of their 
dist ribution were determined by the extent of the role of  
the cen tral government in their provis ion . All the provincial 
and municipal j udges and all the supporting personnel o f  the 
CF! and the municipal courts were paid entirely by the central 
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Minist ry of Just ice .  With regard to Dumaguete , one-quart er 
of the salaries of the two j udges and almo st all the salaries 
of the supporting personnel of the city courts  came from 
Manila . Addit ionally , the cen tral government was also 
responsib le for near ly two thirtls of the salar ies of the four 
city fiscals . In contras t ,  the police forces had to depend 
almost ent i rely on the financial resources of their cit ies 
and municipalities . An addit ional indicat ion of the inab ility 
of the lo cal governments  to  meet the ir responsib ility was the 
fact that all the three police departments in Dumaguete , 
Tanj ay and Bacong had been paying their men and officers 
less than the n ational rates . For the sake of uniformity , 
the Police Connniss ion which establishe d these rat es had 
agreed to make up the differences , but in the last three 
years s ince the promise was made the underpaid policemen of 
Negros Oriental had on ly received a couple of mon ths ' worth 
of sub sidy .  
Fublic transportat ion and communicat ion 
Roads are the basic means of public transportation and 
communicat ion . As elsewhere in the Philipp ines , there were 
five types of roads in Negro s Oriental , dependin g ,  theoreti­
cally , on the sources of funds for their const ruct ion and 
maintenan ce . The mos t  import an t  highways were either nat ional 
hi ghways or the nat ional-provincial roads . The maj or  secondary 
roads linking as well as within the various municipalit ies 
were generally classified as provincial roads . While most 
stree t s  in the cit i es were city s treet s ,  the main thorough­
fares were like ly to be nat ional . Municipal roads referred 
to the small secondary and tertiary roads confined within 
the municipalit ies . 
Excluding the city street s , there were in the whole of  
Negros Oriental 1370 kilomet res of roads . Of  these ,  364  km 
were national-provincial highways , while the provincial and 
municipal roads measured 847 and 159 km in length respect ively . 
With a non-city populat ion of around 580 , 000 , the provin ce 
was t herefore providin g only about 2 . 4  met res of road per 
inhab itant outside the cit ies . In terms of area,  the ratio 
was about 2 62 met res of road every square kilometre . Revealing 
as these figures are , they st ill neglect the very important 
considerat ion of quality . While 1 7 . 8  per cent of the road 
network was hard-surfaced , mostly with asphalt , the rest was 
almost exactly divided between stretches of gravel and dirt . 
Even with the inclusion of the gravel-surfaced port ions of 
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the network ,  then , the provin ce was served at mo st by a total 
of 82 8 km of  dependable roads . Hence it may be  more relevan t 
to say that the province was currently endowed with only 1 . 4 m 
of rural road per inhabitant , or  15 8 m for every square 
kilometre .  
The ro ad networks in Bacong an d  Tanj ay provided a vivid 
illust ration o f  these aggregate data . In Bacon g ,  there were 
8 . 5 an d 10 . 9  km of regularly maintained provinc ial and muni­
cipal roads respectively . Of these , only 2 . 2 km of  municipal 
road around the town hall were asphalted , while gravel surface 
covered a total of 3 . 2  km. In other words , only slightly 
more than one-fourth of the municipality ' s  road network of 
19 . 4  km could be considered adequate . Tanj ay ' s road system 
was equally unsat isfactory . Although all the roads in the 
township were either asphalted or gravel-surfaced , the 
regularly main tained network only s t retched 19 km. Considering 
the fact that Tanj ay ' s area was more than twenty t imes that 
of Bacon g ,  the lat ter ' s  system could actually be regarded as 
more adequate . To Bacong ' s  1 . 3 m of  dependable road p er 
square kilometre , Tanj ay only provided 0 . 35 m. In per capita 
terms , the two mun icipalit ies were about equal , providing a 
mere 0 . 2 5 and 0 . 34 m respect ively . In view o f  these figures 
for Tanj ay , it is very understandab le why it s mayor emphat i­
cally stated the need for addit ional feeder roads linking 
the barrios as the most urgen t  requirement of  his municipality .  
I t  is only reasonable t o  expect that the provis ion o f  
roads in the provincial capit al was better than outside . Of 
a total of 74 . 5  km of roads in Dumaguete , 46 . 4  km were 
asphalted and 6 . 2  km surfaced with gravel . On the basis o f  
it s est imated current population o f  54 , 000 , the city was 
therefore providing a little bit less than one metre of well­
surfaced road per inhab itant , si gnif icant ly less than the 
outside . The proport ion of asphalted roads was o f  course 
much higher in the city . Furthermo re , in terms of area , 
Dumaguete had an average o f  about 942 m of  road in one s quare 
kilometre or was six t imes as well-o ff as most of the rest 
of the province. 
While it is difficult to measure the level of adequacy 
of roads in Negros Oriental in either ab solute or comparat ive 
terms , it is undeniab le that there was a general dissatis­
faction , even among the local o fficials , with the availab ility 
of this polit i cal good . One clear indication o f  the inadequacy 
of the road network in the provin ce was the very small 
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propo rtion of it which was weatherproof . As has been noted 
above , less than one-fifth of the sys tem was asphalted . On 
the other hand , for mo re than twice as long it was without 
any hard surfacing at all and was thus completely subj ect to  
the des tructiveness of  the weather . This fact is  particularly 
significant in view of a very inadequate maintenance . 
Acco rding to the office of the provincial engineer , only 42 
p er cent of the provincial ro ad netwo rk , covering 35 3 km , was 
regularly main tained; the rest (156 km gravel and 337 km 
dirt ) was simply neglected in the absence of any maintenance 
fund allocated to it . 
Since the construction and maint enance of  roads repre­
sented large , b ulky expenditures , they dramatically revealed 
the financial weakmess of the local governments . National 
roads were o f  course completely the respon sibility o f  the 
national government .  In the case of  the national-provincial 
roads and mos t  o f  the city street s , the formal arrangement 
was that the central government only provided the count erpart 
amo unt s  for their construction and upkeep . In practice , the 
provincial and city governments expended much less . During 
the 19 71-72 fis cal y ear , for example , the province and 
Dumaguete put up only 2 1  and 12  p er cent o f  the t otal amount s 
respectively . For the period up to  March 19 7 3 ,  that is for 
the first nine months of  the 19 72-73 fis cal year , the central 
government paid out 402 , 5 98 pesos to  the province an d  2 90 , 591  
pesos to Dumaguate or  7 7  and 100  per  cent of the respective 
sum expended . Even the expenditure fo r the provincial roads 
and some city s t reet s which were suppo sed to be purely lo cal 
funds did in fact come largely from Manila , in the form of 
various tax allotments . Unlike the province and the cities ,  
the municipalit ies main tained only a single bridge and road 
fund into which the central government also contributed 
heavily . Indeed , the municipalit ies collectively received 
a far greater amount o f  sub sidy than they themselves put up . 
In the 19 71-72 fiscal year , the ratio between the total 
national aid and the collective allo cation by the municipal-� 
ities  was almost four to one . For the first nine months of  
19 72-7 3 ,  the national government had contributed more than 
95 per cent of the amount already spent on the municipal 
roads and bridges . 
Summary 
Of all the political goods discussed above , public primary 
and elementary education seemed to be the most amply provided 
in Negro s Oriental .  Considering that education had been 
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given greater emphasis in the Philippines than perhaps any­
where else in Southeast Asia , this fact is not surprisin g .  
Nevertheless , i t  does not alt er the general impress ion that 
the level of the p rovision of politi cal goods and hence the 
level o f  polit ical development in the province was st ill very 
low . Such an impression seemed to b e  widely shared by both 
government official s  and ordinary cit izens in the province . 
A great deal of dissatis fact ion was heard about the lack of 
medical and sanitary servi ces , the tmreliability of the 
police , the expen s iveness and immobilism of  the courts ,  and 
the inadequacy of  the road network. Even the schools did 
not escape criticism for their lack of teachers and facilit ies . 
Indeed , the public primary and elementary schools were almost 
universally regarded as inferior t o  those rtm by the private , 
mostly religious , bodies . The ready availability o f  the 
latter to the more well-of f  memb ers of the connnunit ies might 
perhaps be a s ignificant reason why the dissatis fact ion with 
this polit ical goo d  appeared to be les s  vocal than with the 
others . 
The above data als o  suggest that the greater the partici­
pation of the central government in their provision , the 
greater the availab ility of the political goods and the more 
even their distribut ion among the localit ies . Hen ce ,  the 
police , being most dependent on local resources , was also 
the least adequate . The variat ion , however , is not large . 
Both the medical and j udicial services , which were largely 
financed by the central government , were not very s ignificantly 
more satis factory . ·The fact of the matter is that the local 
government s  were very h eavily dependen t  on Manila . Without 
a very sub stantial part icipat ion by the nat ional government , 
the local communities s imply lacked the means to provide the 
essential polit ical goods . At the same time , the cent ral 
government was no t providing really adequate assistance for 
their provision . 
This  dilennna had given rise t o  much controversy . On the 
one hand , it had been argued that the very weakness of the 
local authorities was the direct consequence of too much 
centraliz ation . One contention was that the central govern­
ment had s imply milked the local connnunities dry . A more 
sophist i cated assertion was that the lon g history of ext reme 
centralizat ion in the Philippines had smothered local in it i­
ative and nourished the hab it of dependency . As the result , 
the lo cal communit ies lacked bo th the capacity and the will 
to stand on their own feet . In support of centralization , 
it had b een argued that only the central government agencies , 
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being less subj ect to local pressures , could effectively 
mob iliz e  local resources and provide the services efficiently .  
In line with the above dat a ,  it had oft en b een po inted out 
that centraliz at ion prevented b latant disparit ies among the 
local tmit s . Most recent ly , it had b een implied that it is 
s imply too difficult , if not impossib le , for the lo cal 
commtmit ies , either direct ly through their own effort s or 
with the as sist an ce of the nat ional agencies , to be self­
supporting.  The implicit assumpt ion was that economic 
development could best be st imulat ed through the nourishment 
of sele ct ive growth centres and sectors of the economy . 
Centralization was needed not only t o  co-ordinate such points 
but also to distrib ute the resulting gains fairly . 
The present  study does not intend to enter into all the 
aspe ct s of the cont roversy . Rather , it is hoped that it 
helps  to facilit ate the debate by estab lishing the common 
points of departure . One of the most crucial of these concerns 
the actual level of the mob ilization of resources in the 
localities . Is it true , as the opponents of centralizat ion 
often claimed , that the to tal amount of resources collec ted 
in the local communities exceeded the total expenditures within 
them by both the national agencies and their own governments? 
In other words , did the central government live off the fat 
of the local units? Or , on the contrary , was the centre 
actually suppor ting the periphery , as some centralists had 
maintained ? The conventional centralization versus decent­
ralizat ion debate does no t directly deal with these questions 
and thi s  largely skirts around the issue . The central prob lem 
is whether the resources b eing :mobilized in the local commun­
ities , either by themselves or through the nat ional agenc ies , 
are sufficient to provide the essential political goods 
adequately . To clarify this po int with regard to Negro s 
Oriental is the task of the following two chap t ers . 
Chapter 3 
The mobilizat ion of resources 
Usually , the debate b etween the centralist s  and the 
decentralists merely revolves around the division of respons­
ibility between the central government and the local author­
ities . In terms of  resources , the is sue in the debate is 
the extent  to which either side should exercise authority in 
the mobilization and expenditure of  resources within the 
local connm.mit ies . This seems to be a secondary problem. 
While decentraliz ation may b e  desirable in any cas e ,  it may 
s imply be impossib le unless the local authorit ies are capable 
of  being self-support ing.  Of greater importance are the 
actual amounts of resources being mob ilized and spent  in the 
localities by both the national governmen t and the local 
authorit ies themselves . This chapter will first dis cuss 
resource mobiliz at ion . 
Bacong and Tanj ay municipalit ies 
The two maj or sources o f  revenue ab le to be  mobilized 
by the municipal government s  were the real property taxes 
and the municipal licences . The former , levied at the maximum 
rate o f  3 per cent of the assessed values o f  lands and 
buildings , - were divided into two components : the basic tax 
and the one p er cen t  contribut ion to the special educat ion 
fund .  Only 45 per cent of the revenue from the bas ic com­
ponent was ret ained by the municipality while an equal port ion 
was forwarded to the province and 10 per cent was returned 
to the barrios . Imposed only on propert ies valued in excess 
of �3000 ( about US$450 in the middle of 1973) , the sp ecial 
educat ion levy was meant to help the municipal government 
meet the expenditures for the cons truction and repair of 
elementary school buildings , salary adj us tments for teachers , 
the purchase and repair of laboratory equipment and teaching 
aids , scholarships ,  etc . Half of the collect ion remained 
with the municipality while the province and the cent ral 
government received 20 p er cent and 30 per cen t  respect ively . 
The municipal licences were collected as f ixed fees from all 
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kinds o f  o ccupat ion or  b usiness conduct ed in the mllllicipality . 
For t he period from July 19 7 1  to  June 19 72 , i . e .  the 
19 71- 7 2  fiscal year , Bacong mob ilized a total of ¥13 , 113 
from the b asic real property t ax ,  ¥7 18 for the special 
educat ion fund , and ¥ 7043 in licen ces . A much richer muni­
cipality , Tanj ay , collected ¥113 , 783 , ¥83 , 918 and ¥36 , 7 38 . 
Evident ly the property owners of Bacong were much poorer than 
those of Tanj ay; most of their real estate was too small t o  
require them to pay the special educat ional levy . 
As ide from the property taxes and licences ,  the muni­
cipalit ies drew their revenues from three other sources . In 
addit ion to permit s ,  fees and charges such as for building,  
documentary and other services of  the municipal s ecretary, 
min ing claims , cattle regist ration , fishin g ,  marriage licences , 
and the impol.lllding of st ray animals ,  the municipal governments 
derived incidental income from rent s ,  penalt ies , and interests 
on bank depos it s .  Finally , they received the proceeds o f  
the operat ion of  such pub lic facilities a s  markets , slaughter­
houses , waterworks , power s t at ions , transportat ion systems 
and cemeteries . In both Bacong and Tanj ay , as in all the 
other ml.lllicipalit ies , the incidental revenues were signifi­
cant ly less than the incomes from the public ut ilit ies .  
Again for the 19 71-72 fis cal year , the two ml.lllicipalit ies 
received ¥2 55 3 and ii'20 , 2 6 3  respect ively o f  the former . At 
the same t ime , they derived ¥7174  and ¥12 3 , 6 72  respectively 
from the lat ter source . It is not eworthy that while fees 
fo r cattle regi stration and f ishing were the main sources 
of the inciden tal revenues ,  market s ,  slaughterhouses and 
waterworks const itut ed the primary utilit i es in the province . 
In muni cipalities where it was provided , elect ricity from 
pub lic power stations also b rought in s ignificant revenues . 
But only s ix of the twenty-two ml.lllicipalit ies op erated these 
stat ions and neither Bacong nor Tanj ay was among them. 
As in other col.llltries , the Bureau of Int ernal Revenue 
was the main resource-mobiliz ing agency of the cen tral 
government in the Philippin es . In the municipalit ies the 
BIR agents we re actually the only mob ilizers of public revenues  
aside from the local o f ficials . On paper , these agen ts were 
respons ible for collecting a long list o f  taxes and charges , 
including business and pro fessional licence fees , bus iness 
and non-busines s income , estat e  and residence t axes , levies 
on forest products and franchise , and documen tary , excise 
and other stamp duties . In actuality , particularly in the 
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poorer municipalities , their responsibility was rather light 
as only a few o f  t hese taxes were in fact yielding subst antial 
revenues .  In Bacon g ,  for example , the total BIR collection 
during 1971-72 amounted to only ¥82 55 or  less than US $1500 . 
Almost 94 per cent of this amount was derived from j ust three 
s ources - business licen ces , non-business income tax ,  and 
residen ce certificates - which contributed ¥42 7 0 , ¥2060 and 
¥1422 respe ctively . Tanj ay , being a much richer municipality ,  
not only offered more lucrative but also a greater number of  
active revenue s ources . In the same fiscal y ear , the muni­
cipality yielded the remarkable sum of  ¥1 , 517 , 833  or about 
184 times the B IR revenue in Bacon g .  In addition t o  the 
three sources also active in Bacong , the BIR in Tanj ay was 
able to tap busines s income and franchise ,  which p roduced 
¥6 88 , 704 and ¥ 7 851 respectively . The largest source o f  
revenue was the non-business income tax which yielded 
¥7 13 , 92 5 .  While ¥40 , 400 was derived from business licences , 
the residence certificates brought in ¥16 , 333 . 
Quit e clearly busines s , mostly in sugar p ro duction , was 
the backbone of Tanj ay ' s  much stronger economy . In Bacong , 
income from busines s yielded only the negligible sum of  ¥106 
to the BIR or 0 . 015 per cent of the revenue from the same 
source in Tanj ay . In total ,  direct business contribution , 
in licen ce fees and income taxes , in the latter municipality 
was 16 7 times that in the former . Tanj ay ' s  claim to being 
the pro fessional and intellectual centre of  the province 
seemed to be borne out by the size of its BIR revenue from 
the occupational/professional licences . To Bacong ' s  �240 , 
Tanj ay produced �39 86 o r  almost seventeen times as much from 
this s ource . 
Sununarizing the results of the mobiliz ational e fforts 
of both the lo cal government s  and the BIR, Tab le 3 . 1  drama­
tically contrasts  the economic fortunes of  the two munici­
palities . Since Tanj ay ' s  population was only about 4 . 3  times 
that of Bacong ' s ,  it may be said that the former was more 
than eleven times as rich as the lat ter . In per capit a terms , 
while the people of  Tanj ay cont ributed almost ¥36 in 19 7 1-72 , '  
the Bacongites were only able to provide j ust over ¥ 3 .  The 
disparity was significantly les s but nevertheless still sub­
stantial when only the amounts mobiliz ed by the local govern­
ment s themselves are compared . On the average , the inhabitants 
of Tanj ay surrendered ¥7 . 10 each to their municipal government 
while those of Bacong contrib uted only ¥2 . 46 or  about one­
third as much . Though t empting , it is not possib le at this 
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point t o  estimate the ext ent to which this contrast is 
indicative of the relative mobilizational capabilit ies of 
the two municipal governments . 
Tab le 3 . 1  
Mobilized resourc es in Bacong and Tanj ay 
during 19 7 1- 7 1 (in pesos , rounded) 
Mobiliz er Bacong Tanj ay 
I .  Municipal government 
1 .  property tax 13 , 831 197 , 701 
2 .  municipal licence 7 , 043 36 , 7 38 
3 .  incidental 2 , 553  20 , 2 63 
4 .  operat ions 7 , 17 4  12 3 , 6 72 
Total 30 , 601 3 7 8 , 3 74 
I I .  BIR 
1 .  business licence 4 , 2 7 0  4 0 , 400 
2 .  occu . licence 2 40 3 , 986 
3 .  business in come tax 106 688 , 7 04 
4 .  non-business income 2 , 060 7 13 , 9 2 4  
5 .  franchise tax 7 , 851 
6 .  residence tax 1 , 42 2  16 , 333 
7 .  others 15 7 46 � 635 
To tal 8 , 2 5 6  1 , 517 , 833 
Grand total 38 , 85 7  1 , 896 , 207 
No less dramatically , the tab le also reveals the sharp 
con trast b etween Bacong and Tanj ay in terms o f  the relative 
amount s  co llected by their own governments and the BIR. 
While 79 per cent of the total amount mobilized in the former 
municipality was the result of it s own effort , almo st exact ly 
the reverse ( 80 per cen t )  was true in the lat ter . This 
suggests  that the richer mun icipality the greater , both 
abs olut ely and relatively , the proportion of  the total 
mobiliz ed amount collected in it on behalf o f  the central 
government . 
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The province as a whole 
Tab le 3 . 2  sunnnarizes all the revenues mob iliz ed in all 
the municipalit ies in Negros Oriental , including Bacong and 
Tanj ay . From the table it is clear that Tanj ay was by far 
the largest producer of  revenues in the province , although 
per capita it s much smaller neighbour , Pamplona , was a bit 
ahead . With the possible except ion of Bas ay , Bacong was 
the poorest municipality . As Table 3 . 1 has already suggested , 
it is true that the richer the mun icipality the greater the 
proportion of the BIR collection . Except for Amlan , all the 
municipalities with a per capita mobilization of more than 
6 pesos yield more to the BIR than to their own government s .  
The main reason for this is that most o f  these municipalit ies 
were rich primarily because of the presence of the sugar 
industry within the ir boundaries . Since this indust ry was 
concentrated and rather capit al intensive , it offered a 
convenient  source o f  revenue to the BIR. For the same reason , 
the higher per capita amounts mobilized in these municipalit ies 
did no t really indicate equally higher levels of  general 
prosperity which con st ituted the basis of local mob ilizat ion . 
As the provincial government did not have a special 
terr itory of it s own , it lacked any maj or source of revenue 
it could mobilize itself . Hen ce ,  fo r the 19 71-72 fiscal 
year , it collected a total o f  only �155 , 130 in incidental 
revenues . This amounted to only a litt le bit more than one­
twentieth of the current receipt s in the province ' s  general 
fund b udget . The res t came as cont ribut ion s  from the muni­
cipalit ies ,  cit ies and the nat ional government . 
While the BIR op erated in the cit ies and the munici­
palit ies , two central government agencies mob iliz ed revenues 
province-wide . By far the most important of  these was the 
Motor Vehicles Off ice and Land Transportat ion Conrrniss ion 
which during 19 7 1 -7 2  collected ¥ 1 , 054 , 9 6 1 , mos tly in 
registrat ion and licence fees . This amount included , however , 
an estimated collection of  ¥300 , 000 for the city of Dumaguete 
which, being the provincial capital , did not have a special 
MV/LTC office of  its own like the other two cit ies . The 
other mob ilizing agency of the central government ,  the o ffice 
of the Registrar of Deeds , earned on ly ¥14 7 , 189 for the same 
period . Finally , although not a spe cifically revenue 
collecting agency , the Court of the First Instance brought 
in the small amount o f  �12 , 346 in fees . 
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Table 3 . 2  
Mobilized resources in the mtmicipalit ies of  
Negros Oriental during 19 7 1-72  
(in pesos , rotmded) 
Mtmicipalit ies Own mobi- BIR Tot al Per lization capit a a 
Amlan 8 3 ,  7 7 6  80 , 603 164 , 379 13 . 8  
Ayungon 4 8 , 003 2 15 , 9 35 2 63 , 938 10 . 7  
Bacong 30 , 601 8 , 256b 38 , 85 7 3 . 1 Basay 14 , 2 94  
Bayawan 19 4 , 1 34 7 7 , 1 73  2 71 , 307  5 . 9 
Bindoy 7 2 , 769 154 , 052 22 6 ,  821 12 . 0  
Dauin 44 , 094 8 , 5 02 52 , 29 6  3 . 8 
Guihulngan 217 , 018 2 60 , 49 7  47 7 , 515 6 . 4 
Jimalalud 51 , 2 6 5  18 , 692  69 , 9 5 7  3 . 7 
La Libert ad 89 , 4 36 c 2 6 , 609 116 , 04 5  3 . 9 
Mabinay 95 , 690  184 , 07 6  2 79 , 766 8 . 0 
Manj uyod 80 , 800 344 , 611 42 5 , 411 2 0 . 1 
Pamplona 83 , 062 7 17 , 852 800 , 918  3 7 . 9  
San Jose 29 , 69 8  47 , 399  7 7 , 09 7 8 . 5 
St Catalina 7 0 , 706 418 , 600 489 , 306 12 . 0  
Sia ton 66 , 190 36 , 920 103 , 110 3 . 7 
Sibulan 90 , 914 188 , 2 89 2 7 9 , 2 03 16 . 1  
Tanj ay 376 , 374 1 , 5 17 , 833 1 , 894 , 20 7  35 . 7  
Tay as an 61 , 494 2 5 , 108 86 , 602 4 . 2  
Valencia 45 , 320  30 , 889 76 , 2 09 5 . 6  
Vallehermoso 5 5 , 756 186 , 370 2 42 , 12 6  11 . 5  
Zamboangita 5 7 , 9 19 8 , 2 53 66 , 172 5 . 6 
Tot al 1 , 959 , 313 4 , 556 , 569 6 , 515 , 882 
a On the basis of  estimates of 19 71 population , calculated 
as being 3 p er cent more than those of 19 7 0  census . 
b Became a separate mtmicipality from Bayawan only in 
January 19 72 . Hence, BIR collection is still credited  
to Bayawan . 
c This figure is for 1970- 7 1  since data for 19 71-72 were 
not available . According to the office of the provincial 
treasurer , the municipal treasurer disappeared with the 
monies and the reco rds . 
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In to tal , then , ¥7 , 5 85 , 508 was mobilized in the province 
of  Negros Oriental proper . Table 3 . 3  details the amounts 
from the different sources . 
Municipal 
Tab le 3 . 3  
Resource mobilization in Negros Oriental , 
excluding the cities , 19 7 1- 7 2  
(in peso s , rounded) 
Mobilizer Amount mobilized 
government s  1 , 959 , 313 
Provincial government 155 , 130 
BIR 4 , 556 , 569 
MVO/LTC 754 , 9 61 
Registrar of Deeds 14 7 , 189 
CF! 12 2 34 6 
Total 7 , 5 85 , 508  
The city of Dumaguete 
Philippine char.t ered cities occupied an int eres ting 
position in the adminis trative syst em.  Territ orially part 
of their provin ces , they were nevertheless of the same 
administ rative status as the provinces and were almost com­
plet ely independent of t hem. By virtue of their special 
characte r ,  the cities enj oyed several financial privileges 
as compared to the municipalities . They were allowed not 
only to exploit more sources of revenue , but also to ret ain 
greater portions of the result s of  their mobiliz ational 
efforts . Like a municipality ,  a city derived a large portion 
of  its tot al self-mob il ized revenue from the real property 
tax and the municipal licences . Furt hermore , as in a muni­
cipality ,  the former was divided into the basic tax and the 
special education levy . However ,  while only 45 per cent of 
the basic component was ret ained by the municipality ,  the 
city had to give up only the 10 per cent barrio share . 
Instead o f  only 50 per cent , the city retained 60 per cent 
of the extra education tax,  surrendering all the rest to the 
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national treasury . In addit ion to the fixed o ccupation and 
business licence fees , the muni cipal licences in the cit ies 
also included a sales tax levied at the rate of  one per cent  
on all items except grains , meats and drugs whi ch carried 
only a 0 . 5 per cent surcharge . Sub stant ial sources o f  
taxation revenue available in the cit ies but n o t  in the 
municipalit i es included the amusement and liquor taxes , and 
charges on bulk storage . 
In Dumaguete , the municipal licences which con st itut ed 
th e largest source of the city ' s  t axation revenue produced 
a t otal of ¥62 8 , 309 in 1971-72 . During the same period , the 
city collected ¥ 362 , 19 1  in real p roperty taxes , �11 , 103 in 
amusemen t and liquor taxes , �35 , 402 in parking fees , and 
¥51 , 56 3  in st orage tax on copra and gasoline . All in all , 
the city ' s  revenue from thes e plus one other small source 
amounted to �1 , 089 , 754 in 19 71-72 . 
Bes ides those available in Bacong and Tanj ay ,  Dumaguete 
was ab le to top o ther sources of inc ident al income including 
high s chool tuition fees , sanitary and industrial safety 
inspection charges , sto ckyard fees , and court collect ions . 
Altogether , this component of  the city revenue came to 
¥165 , 4 57 . As in Bacong and Tanj ay ,  the receipt s from the 
operat ion of the pub lic markets ,  the slaughterhouse and the 
waterworks were cont ribut ing very substantially to the city ' s  
treasury . They t ot alled ¥46 7 , 5 74 in the same period . 
The BIR remained the mo st important res ource mob iliz ing 
agency of  the central government in the cit ies . In Dumaguete , 
the B IR collection s for 19 71- 72 added up to a total o f  
�1 , 7 7 1 , 9 38 .  O f  this amount , the combined t axes on the 
b us iness and non-business incomes cont ributed P 6 7 4 , 6 74 while 
the b us iness and occupation licen ces , fran chis e ,  resident 
and t rans fer taxes , and charges on fo rest products made up 
anothe r ¥9 71 , 4 30 .  Interestingly , the three largest corpor­
at ions in the city - the b ranches of  the Philippine Nat ional 
Bank ,  a brewery and a copra exporting firm - paid almost 40 
per cent of the in come t axes . 
Being the cent ral port of the provin ce as well as it s 
capital , Dtllllaguete provided the nat ional Port and Customs 
Authority with a subst ant ial amount o f  revenue from wharfage 
charges and cus toms dut ies . In 19 71-72 , the t ot al collections  
from these two sources amoun ted to ¥846 , 02 7  or  j us t  a b it 
les s than hal f  the total BIR collect ion . It may be  noted 
that the port and customs agency in Dumaguete was a district 
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office in charge of all the po rt s  in Negros Oriental as well 
as one port in Negros Occidental . Unfortunately , it was too 
dif ficult to it emize the collections at these different 
ports . Since the ports in the province o ther than the one 
at Bais City were rather small ,  the failure to include their 
revenues in the to tal mobilized resources of the province 
proper should not b e  very significant . At any rate , the 
above figures do represent the collec tions for Dumaguete 
alone . 
As has b een noted above , there is no special motor 
vehicle  and land transport at ion o ffice in Dumaguete .  The 
¥300 , 000 deduct ed as the city ' s  share o f  the total collection 
by the MVO/LTC for the entire province has been estimated as 
roughly twice the amount collected in Bais . The last and 
the smallest source of cent ral government revenue in Dumaguet e  
i s  the regist rat ion o f  deeds which in 19 71-72 took in ¥2 9 , 2 14 .  
In summary , Tab le 3 . 4  shows that a total o f  ¥4 , 6 69 , 964 
was mobilized in Dumaguete during 19 71-72 . 
Tab le 3 . 4  
Mobilized resources o f  Dumaguete,  19 7 1-72 
(in pesos , rounded) 
Source 
I .  City government 
municipal licen ces 
real property t axes 
other levies 
incidental revenues 
operations 
II . Central government agencies 
B IR 
Port and customs 
MVO/LTC 
Re gistrar o f  deeds 
Tot al 
62 8 , 309 
362 , 191 
9 9 , 2 54 
165 , 45 7  
4 6 7 , 5 74 
1 ,  7 71 ,  9 38 
846 , 02 7  
300 , 000 
29 , 2 14 
Amount 
1 ,  722 ' 7 85 
2 , 947 , 17 9  
4 , 669 , 964  
32 
This is almost 60 per cent o f  the total mob iliz at ion 
throughout the province proper during the same period . It 
is only a bit less than two and one-half t imes the mobilized 
resources of  Tanj ay , the richest mllllicipality . 
Chapter 4 
Pub lic expenditures 
As the preceding d is cus sion has in dicated , only a 
portion of the amotmt of resources mob ilized in a municipality , 
a city , or a province was retained in that lo cality . On 
the other hand , each lo cal unit was ab le to spend more than 
the portion it retained , thanks to external subsidies . 
Moreove r ,  external agencies , primarily those of the central 
government , also directly spent resources in each lo calit y ,  
addin g  t o  it s own expenditures . From the perspective of 
the conventional centraliz at ion versus decentraliz at ion 
debate ,  the first issue involves the size of the port ion of 
the mob ilized resources to be ret ained by the lo cality con­
cerned .  Secondly , the problem is how much of the total 
public expendit ure in a local community shoul d b e  spent 
directly by the external agencies . These are provo cat ive 
quest ions , but the more ftmdament al issue is the relat ionship 
between the amotmt of resources mob iliz ed in a locality and 
the total public expenditure in it . Followin g the accounting 
of the former in the last chapt er , the present one will 
determine the latter and , at the same t ime , delineate its 
sources . 
The municipalit ies of Bacong an d  Tanj ay 
Every municipality operated four separate budget s :  the 
general ftmd , the permanent public improvement fund , the 
road and bridge ftmd , and the special educat ion fun d .  Of 
these , only the last did not include regular con tribut ions 
from the central government . In the case of the general 
fund ,  which was the principal source of expenditure , the 
external component was mostly made up of a rather confusing 
var iety o f  allotments from the various taxes collected by 
the B IR, in cluding an apport ionment designated generally as 
the internal revenue allotment . An equal amoun t of this 
general share together with a certain percentage of the 
general fund constituted the permanen t  public improvement 
fund .  The road and bridge fund contained in turn a transfer 
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from the permanent pub lic improvement fund plus a sp ecial 
national aid .  In addition to the 50 per cent share of the 
one per cent extra real property tax collection in the 
municipality ,  the special education fund might receive a 
cont ribution from the National Educat ion Stabiliz ation Fund .  
Table 4 . 1 delineates the amount s in the various budget 
funds in Bacong and Tanj ay .  It may be no ted that the amounts 
in the general funds resultin g  from the municipalities ' own 
mobiliz at ion were less than similarly designated amount s in 
Tab le 3 . 1 .  The dis crepancy i s  the refl ection of the fact 
that not  all the revenues f rom the property t ax were retained 
by the lo calities . Since the permanent pub lic improvement 
fund and the road and bridge fund each contained a t ransfer 
from another fund , the total amount s  available in Bacon g and 
Tanj ay from all the four funds were less than the simple 
sums of the amounts in them. It is clear that , as a proponen t  
of greater decentraliz ation might point out , b oth munici­
palities were very dependent on the allotment s from the 
central government . For Bacon g ,  ¥91 , 59 6  or  about 80 per cent 
of the ¥114 , 62 7  available to it in 19 71-72  came from Manil a .  
Receiving ¥64 8 , 82 0  in national allotments , Tanj ay was 
dependen t on the cent ral government for more than 70 p er cent 
of it s tot al budget . 
As in the other municipalities , the biggest direct and 
recurrent expenditure by the national government in Bacong 
and Tanj ay covered the salaries of the primary and element ary 
s chool t eachers . In 19 71-72 , this item co st the minist ry o f  
educat ion ¥312 , 836 and ¥1 , 164 , 796  in the two municipalit ies 
respectively . Unfortunately , no informat ion was available 
regarding the medical expendit ure in either municipality , 
except for the salaries of the medical personnel which 
amounted to ¥5 3 , 2 32 in Tanj ay and ¥19 , 608  in Bacong , including 
the respective amount s of ¥ 6 , 180 and ¥3 , 300 paid by the pro­
vincial government . With regard to the municipal courts the 
central government was actually responsible only for the 
salaries of their p ersonnel which came to a mere �4 , 800 in 
B acong , representing half of the salary of it s part-time 
j udge , and ¥16 , 22 4  in Tanj ay for a full-time magist rate and 
a cle rk .  
Two nation al agen cies operat ing dire ctly in the munici­
palities were j ointly con cerned with stimulat in g  rural 
developmen t . The Bureau of Agricultural Extension ( BAE) was 
in charge of the general e ffort to raise rural productivity ,  
I .  
I I .  
Tab le 4 . 1 
Bud get funds in Bacon g and Tanj ay , 19 71-72 
( in pesos , rounded) 
Bacong Tanj ay 
General Fund : 
Own mobiliz ation 22 , 6 72 2 2 7 , 7 7 8  
Nat ional allotments 66 , 2 7 0  5 5 8 , 862 
Nat ional subsidy 3 , 2 80 12 ' 809 
P rovincial aid 2 , 300 
Total 92 , 222  801 , 749 
Permanent Public Improvemen t 
Fund : 
Trans fer from general fund 7 , 99 9  85 , 954 
Allo tment 8 , 682 41 , 642 
Total 16 2 6 81 12 7 , 596  
III . Road and Bridge Fund : 
Trans fer from PP! fund 6 , 000 2 5 , 000 
Nat ional aid 1 1 , 806 35 , 507 
Total 1 7 2 806 6 0 , 5 07 
IV. Special Education Fund : 
P roperty tax 359 41 , 958 
Nat ional Stabilization Fund l , 558a 
Total 1 , 91 7  41 , 958 
Grand total 12 8 ' 62 6  1 , 03 1 , 810 
Trans fer between f nnds 13 2 999 110 , 95 4  
Total available 114 , 62 7  92 0 , 856 
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a This figure is actually for 1970- 7 1 , For 1 9 7 1 - 7 2 , 
¥2 3 , 541 was requested from the Nat ional Stabilizat ion 
Fund ,  but it could not be fonnd out how much of this was 
actually granted . 
especially in rice and corn , while the Pres iden t ial Arm for 
Commnnity Development (PACD) had the more specific task of 
ass ist ing and supervis ing ba:Prio improvement .  In each muni­
cipality , the municipal PACD officer , or the municipal 
development o f ficer as he was officially called , advised the 
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barrio councils on how to spend their 10 per cen t share o f  
the basic real property tax which in Bacong and Tanj ay 
totalled ¥1 , 311 and ¥11 , 378  respectively . Additionally , 
his approval was necessary before a barrio council could 
spend any part of the Fl5 000 annual allocation received from 
the national Barrio Development Fund .  Since this grant was 
uniform and there were 22 and 15 barrios in Bacong and 
Tanj ay respe ctively ,  the PACD was thus regularly contributing 
¥22 , 00 0  and ¥15 , 000 t o  the yearly pub lic expenditures in 
thes e municipalities . Like the development o f ficer , the 
municipal agriculturis t was also in charge of a special fund , 
the Rice and Corn Production Fund , which apparently covered 
the salaries of the ext ension specialists assigned with him 
in the municipality .  In Bacong , there were two agricultural 
demonst rators and both were paid by the national government 
while two of the three ext ension workers in Tanj ay received 
their salaries from the provincial funds .  Altogether ,  the 
PACD and the BAE spent ¥12 , 44 4  and ¥15 , 612 in salaries in 
Bacong and Tanj ay respectively in 19 7 1-72 . In addition , the 
two agencies were also responsible for o ccasionally spending 
ext ra funds from their own resources and from grants ob tained 
by the municipalities from a variety of external sources , 
including the special congressional pork-b arrel allocat ions . 
Being irregular , these  funds were , unfortunately , dif ficult 
to account for . 
Finally , the national government provided for the 
expenses and salaries of the municipal po stal s ervice and 
the o ffi ce of the Connnission on Elect ion . Since they were 
minor , no informat ion was obtained on their amount s .  Needless 
to say ,  the po st office also obt ained revenues from it s 
op erations . 
In addition to its salary contributions t o  the medical 
and agricultural extension services , the provincial government 
added considerably to the total public expenditures in the 
municipalities through the p rovincial roads within them. 
On the basis of an average maintenance cost of  ¥1 , 12 5  per 
kilometre a y ear as estimated by the office o f  the provincial 
engineer , the provin ce spent ¥9 , 5 62 and ¥11 , 02 5  in Bacong 
and Tanj ay respectively in 19 7 1- 72 for normal repair and 
improvement alon e .  The expenditures fo r maj o r  upgrading 
proj ects and the const ruction of  new roads must be added to 
the routine expenses but they were difficult to apportion to 
a particular fis cal year . 
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To s unnnariz e ,  Tab le 4 . 2  totals the pub lic expenditures 
in Bacong and Tanj ay for the 19 71- 72 fis cal y ear to ¥49 7 , 188 
and ¥2 , 208 , 12 3  respectively . Since they represented the 
recurren t ,  rout ine expenditures , these sums obviously under­
stated the actual amounts of public resources consumed in 
these municipalities that year . How much the elusive expen­
ditures in any year added up to is difficult to j udge but any 
att empt at estimat ing the aggregate sum mus t take in to 
account not only the irregular subs idies and grants such as 
those made by the Minis t ry of Health and the PACD but also 
the maj or  appropriat ions for the construct ion , expans ion , 
repair and equipmen t o f  schools , municipal buildings , clinics , 
public ut ilities , public sanitat ion facilit ies , as well as 
roads and bridges . In this connect ion , it may be  noted , for 
example,  that almo st ¥150 , 000 from the nat ional funds had 
been spent in the last few years for the building and equip­
ment of Bacon g ' s new municipal hall . Even as it st ands , 
the t ab le must impress both the decentralists and the 
cent ralist s alike . Almost  three-quarters of the total public 
expenditure in Bacong and more than half of  that in Tanj ay 
in 19 71-72 came directly from the nat ional government . 
Together with the subsidies and allotmen ts to the municipal 
funds , Manila was responsib le for 88 per cent and 83 per 
cent o f  the resources spent in the two municipalit ies 
respect ively . 
The provin ce 
The general fund expendit ures o f  the twenty-two mun ici­
palit ies in Negros Oriental added up to ¥4 , 466 , 418 in 1971-7 2 .  
Of this amount , only ¥1 , 2 86 , 003 o r  about 29 p er cent resulted 
from their own mob ilizat ion efforts , while ¥3 , 0 7 4 , 851 or 69 
per cent came as revenue allo tments  from the central govern­
ment . Provincial aid amounted to j ust ¥12 , 800 . Addit ional 
nat ional allotments  and aid to the permanent public improve­
ment funds and th e road an d  b ridge funds further cont ributed 
¥571 , 6 78 and ¥449 , 220  respect ively to the municipal expen­
ditures . Finally , the municipal governments collectively 
had available to them ¥130 , 036 real estate tax revenue and 
¥38 , 02 3  subsidy from the national educat ional stab iliz at ion 
fund in their spe cial educat ion funds . In all , then , 
¥5 , 655 , 375 were available for expenditure by the mun ici­
palities in 19 71- 72 . Almost 75  per cent of this total came 
from Manila . 
As we have j ust seen with regard to  Bacong an d  Tanj ay , 
direct spending by the municipal governments accounted for 
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Table 4 . 2  
Pub lic expendit ure in Bacong and Tanj ay , 19 71-72 
( in pesos , rounded) 
Sour ces Amounts 
Bacong Tanj ay 
Barrios : 
10% b asic property tax 1 , 311 1 1 , 3 7 8  
Municipal government 114 , 62 7  92 0 , 85 6 
Provincial government : 
salaries , medi cal 3 , 300 6 , 180 
salaries , BAE 6 , 9 60 
ro ad maint enance 9 , 5 62 11 , 02 5 
Nat ional government : 
salaries , teachers 312 , 8 36 1 , 164 , 796  
salaries , medi cal 16 , 308 47 , 052 
salaries , j udicial 4 , 800 16 , 22 4  
salaries , BAE/PACD 12 , 444 8 , 652 
barPio development fund 22 , 000 15 , 000 
Total 49 7 , 188 2 , 2 08 , 12 3  
the smaller part o f  the total expendit ure in the munici­
palit i es . The salaries of all the primary and elementary 
school teachers alone amounted to ¥11 , 762 , 376  in 1 9 7 1-72 - 1 more than twice the total available in the mun icipal funds . 
To this amount must be  added the salar ies of the municipal 
medical and j udicial servi ces . Of the ¥609 , 61 7  spent for 
the medical personnel , only ¥12 7 , 4 80 came from the provincial 
government . Sin ce the municipal j udges were differentially 
paid accordin g to the ranking of the ir municipalit ies and 
since the number of court personnel also varie d ,  no exact 
figure co uld be ob tained of the tot al amount paid annually 
by the central government for the salaries of the municipal 
j udges and their staffs . Taking a reasonable average of 
¥12 , 000 per municipality , we may s imply est imate this amount 
to be about ¥264 , 000 . Finally , the salaries of the BAE /PACD 
personnel throughout the municipalities amounted to ¥287 , 544 , 
¥190 , 404 of which came from the central government . 
lrrhis figure may differ slightly from the actual amount since 
the s ums for many of the municipalit ies have been calculated 
s imply on the basis of the outlays for the first month (July 
19 71) . 
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Three other outlets for expenditure within the individual 
muni cipalities  were the maintenan ce o f  provincial roads , 
barrio development , an d  the barrio share of the basic property 
tax. With regard to the first , it is diff icult to determine 
it s po rtion of the total provincial road and bridge fund .  
Since n o  exact number o f  barrios within the twenty-two muni­
cipalit ies in the province could be determined , we can only 
es timate the total PACD allotment s to be about ¥400 , 000 . 
As the total mob iliz ation o f  the b as i c  property t ax by the 
mun icipalities amount ed to ¥ 7 47 , 4 7 0 ,  the 10 per cent share 
of the ba.rrios came t o  ¥74 , 74 7 . 
For general expendit ure not sp ecific to the individual 
municipalities , the provincial government operated four 
funds : the general fund ,  the national-provincial road and 
bridge fund , the provincial road and bridge fund , and the 
special education fund .  Aside from the operat ion of the 
provincial government , the general fund covered an assortment 
of ' intergovernmental aids ' to the barrios and municipalit ies . 
In 19 7 1-72 , these s ubs idies and cont ributions for the repair 
of element ary schools , the expans ion of pub lic markets , food 
production campaign , et c . , amount ed to almost 10 per cent of 
the ¥2 , 892 , 8 76 available in the general flllld .  O f  this total 
amount , ¥ 2 , 1 35 , 941 or about 74  per cen t  came from the cen tral 
government in the form of allotments and aid . 
The two ro ad and br idge funds were intended for the 
repair and maint enance of nat ional-provincial and provincial 
roads respe ctively • . Of the ¥82 6 , 5 78 available in 19 71-72 in 
the nat ional-provincial fund , ¥413 , 0 79  or almost exactly half 
came as nat ional aid .  In fact , the provincial portion was 
much less than the remainder as this const ituted a t rans fer 
from the purely provincial road and bridge fund . Containing 
a total of  ¥2 , 031 , 6 7 7 , this second fund only received 
¥88 , 870  from the provin ce , the rest  bein g  made up of revenue 
allotment s from the central government . Comb ined , then , the 
two funds totalled ¥2 , 444 , 75 6 . Les s  than 4 per cent of this 
came directly from the province . 
While the primary and elementary schools were directly 
operated by the Ministry of Educat ion , the provincial govern­
ment was responsible fo r the provin cial high s chool in 
Dumaguet e .  It was primarily to cover the school ' s  salary 
adj ustments and addit ional expenses not directly ab sorbed by 
the general fund that the province operat ed the special 
educat ion fund .  Of the ¥16 7 , 80 7  available in the fund in 
19 71-72 , ¥111 , 911 also came from Manila . 
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Although the provin cial dental of fice was integral ly 
part o f  the provincial government , part o f  its expenditure 
was paid fo r by the central government which in 19 7 1-72 
allocated ¥42 , 92 0 .  An independent bud get drawing con tribut ions  
from the  municipal , city , provincial and central government s  
underwro te the p rovincial hosp it al . Since the port ions from 
the municipalities and the province were already included 
in their general flIDd expenditures , it is necessary only to 
ac colID.t fo r the contribut ion from the nat ional government . 
Fo r the 19 7 1-72  fis cal year , the nat ional coun terpart 
amolID.ted to exactly ¥2 00 , 000 . 
On its own , the cent ral government directly con tributed 
two maj or sources of general expenditure in the provin ce . 
In the firs t place , it was fully responsib le for the operating 
expenses o f  the five branches of the Court of the First 
Inst ance which added up to ¥268 , 014 in salaries alone . A 
much bigger sum was allo cated through the Bureau of Public 
Highways for the construct ion , improvemen t ,  upgrading and 
maintenance of the nat ional ro ads . For the 197 1-72  fiscal 
year , these it ems co st the national government ¥2 , 2 13 , 403 . 
It may be noted that some of the polit ical goods and services 
provided by the direct national expenditures were ext ended 
to the three cit ies in the province .  For this reason , they 
exaggerated to  some extent the total expenditures in the 
province proper .  On the other hand , these amount s already 
unders tated the actual cost s  which could not all be readily 
account ed for . In addition , the cen tral government had b een 
spending substant ial amount s to run such off ices as those 
o f  the Motor Vehicle and Land Transportat ion , the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue , the PACD/Bureau of Agricultural Extension , 
e t c .  
In sunnnary , Table 4 . 3  adds up the expenditures in the 
province proper . To re-emphasize , these represented largely 
the recurrent , rout in e ,  and readily definable costs of pro­
viding the political goo ds and services to the people o f  
Negros Oriental . 
Dumaguete City 
Unlike the province and the mun icipalit ies , the ci t ies 
op erated only three funds : the general fund , the road and 
bridge fund , and the special educat ion fund . In Dumaguete , 
incomes going in to the general fund totalled ¥2 , 103 , 7 30 
during 19 7 1-72 . Of this amolIDt , ¥45 7 , 62 0  came as various 
tax allo tmen t s  from the nat ion al governmen t .  The road and 
Tab le 4 . 3  
Public expenditure in Negros Oriental , 
excluding the cit ies , 1971-72 
( in peso s , rounded) 
I.  Within individual municipalit ies : 
by municipal government s 
by barrio councils 
by the provincial and cen tral 
governments 
II.  General : 
by the provincial government 
by the central government 
Tot al 
5 , 655 , 375  
4 74 , 747  
13 , 32 3 , 53 7  
a 5 , 548 , 359b 2 , 681 , 417 
2 7 , 683 , 435 
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a This  includes the expenditure of  maintaining provincial 
roads w ithin the municipalities . 
b Includes ¥200 , 000 counterpart  fund in the independent 
budget of  the provincial hospital . 
bridge fund was made up s imply o f  a transfer from th e general 
fund and a national sub sidy which in 19 71-72  amounted to 
¥2 4 , 139 and ¥17 9 , 32 8  respectively . Const itut ing 60 per cent 
of  the supplemen tary tax on real estate , the city portion o f  
the special educat ion fund came to ¥94 , 661 . The rest o f  the 
¥12 7 , 619 available in the fund was returned f rom the nat ional 
educat ion stabilizat ion fund . In total , then , the city had 
¥2 , 410 , 6 7 7  to spend during 1971-7 2 . Only 72 per cent of 
this amount con stituted the city ' s  own funds . 
In addit ion to the indirect subs idies into the city 
budgets , the nat ional government als o con tributed directly 
to the operat ion of some of t he city departments . Many city 
o f f i c ials such as the city auditor , the city fis cal , the 
city j udges and their ass istant s �  received only part of  
their salaries from the city and thus were part ially dependent 
on Man ila . In 1971-72 , these supplementary salaries added 
up to ¥81 , 42 9 .  Since 197 0 , the national Police Connnis s ion 
has also been providing supplementary salary adj ustments to 
police o ff icers throughout the coun try .  In 19 7 1-7 2 , Dumaguete 
police departmen t r eceived ¥ 32 , 532 but this amount was 
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incorporated into the general fund . Although the city was 
fully responsib le for the salaries of the city health office 
p ersonnel , all the medicines and medical supplies and 
equipment are provided directly and indirectly by Manila . 
In 19 7 1-72 , medicines alone were worth ¥8 , 058  at cost . 
Pub lic works and education were the two principal items 
of direct national expenditure in the city . To construct , 
improve and maintain the national roads in the city , the 
Bureau of Pub lic Highways spent  a total amount of ¥34 1 , 087 
between July 19 7 1  and June 19 72 . The salaries o f  the city ' s 
primary and elemen tary school teachers ,  which constituted 
the bulk of the educational expenditure , cost the national 
government ¥ 7 7 7 , 6 86 durin g the same fis cal y ear . An aid 
for contingent  expenses to the primary and elementary schools 
and general grants to the city high s chool added ¥31 , 086 
to this amoun t .  
On top o f  these , the national government was directly 
responsible for the operat ional expenses o f  several national 
offices located in the city . Perhaps the biggest of  these 
are the district branches of the Port and Customs Authority 
and the Bureau of Internal Revenue . Unfortunately , no 
information was ob tain ed on their expenditures and , as they 
did not only serve Dumaguete , it would have been difficult 
in any case to isolate exact ly the portions chargeable to 
the city . A rough estimat e for the Ports and Cus toms office 
may be made on the basis of it s expenditures during a six­
month period from July to December 1972 which amounted to 
¥71 , 9 13 . Using this figure as an average six-month expend­
iture not only fo r 19 72-73  but also for 19 71-7 2 , and allo­
cating three-quarters of the to tal amount to the city , we 
arrive at an es timate of about ¥100 , 000 for the earlier 
fis cal y ear . Since an equal amount could reasonab ly be  
estimated for  the BIR, the operation of the two off ices cost 
the central government roughly ¥200 , 000 . In addition , a 
tot al of ¥2 9 , 9 40 was paid in salaries for the PACD and the 
office of the regis trar of deeds . 
Finally , as the third agent o f  public expenditure , the 
bar1?io councils in the city had ¥42 , 548  to spend in 197 1-72 . 
While ¥22 , 000 of this amount came as the s t andard annual 
allocation s from the PACD , the rest represen ted the barrios ' 
10 per cent share of the city ' s  basic property t ax .  
As Tab le 4 . 4  shows , then , the Dumaguetenos had a total 
of ¥ 3 , 922 , 511 in pub lic funds spent on them during the 
Tab le 4 . 4  
Public expenditure in Dumaguete City 
19 7 1-72 ( in pesos , rounded) 
Agent of  expenditure 
The city government 
The national government : 
subsidies 
direct expenditure 
The barrio councils 
89 » 48 7  
1 , 3 7 9 , 799 
Total 
Amount 
2 , 410 , 677  
1 , 469 , 2 86 
42 , 548  
3 , 922 , 511 
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19 71-72 fiscal year . It  may be not ed that more than 3 7  p er 
cent o f  the total expen diture came directly from the nat ional 
government . 
Conclusion 
The determinat ion of pub lic expen diture proved to be 
more difficult than the account ing of public incomes . For 
this reason , the expenditures from the various budget funds 
of the three levels of  governmen t studied have s imply been 
equated with the amount s available in these funds . This 
procedure is distorting to the ext en t  that surpluses might 
be realized at the end of the fis cal year . In the presen t 
cas e ,  however , a strong impress ion was gained during the 
res earch that the surpluses , if there were any , could have 
been very minimal . 
The aggregate f igures in this chapt er should also be 
reasonably dependable for two other reasons . All the est imates 
have purpos ely been made conservat ively . More importantly , 
they only include expenditures that were relatively easy to 
ident ify . The less t ractable expenditures comprised no t only 
such it ems as office equipment and suppli es not covered by 
the funds but also the notorious yet elus ive congress ional 
pork-barrel allo cations . 
Chapter 5 
Dependence and centralization 
The central contention of this study is that the con cern 
about the relative roles of the central government and the 
local connnunit ies in the mob ilization and expendit ure of  
resources is  secondary to the relative amount s of pub lic 
resources mobilized and spent  in the localit ies . A lo cal 
tmit which absorbs mo re resources than it produces  cannot 
in any meaningful sense be autonomous . 
As the last two chapt ers reveal , the overwhelmin g fact 
about Negro s Oriental is precisely it s b asic dependence on 
the central governmen t .  Able to provide less than one-third 
of the resources it required , the province proper woul d ,  
tmder the prevailing condit ions , have b een completely bank­
rupt on it s own . The case of many of the individual mtmici­
palities was much worse . Bacong , for instance , could only 
produce less than one-tenth of it s resource requirements . 
Of course ,  this municipality is the poorest in the provin ce ,  
but even Tanj ay , the richest municipality ,  was a deficit 
connntmity unable to meet about one-seventh of the expendi­
tures it absorbed .  As the median tot al mobilization among 
the twenty-two municipalities in the province was less than 
one-fourth of that of Tanj ay (Tab le 3 . 2 ) , it is obvious that 
most of these mllllicipalities were very heavily dependent on 
external sustenance .  
It is  significant that Dumaguete did produce a surplus 
of almost  ¥750 , 000 . Being the richest of the three cities 
in the province , Bais had an even b etter record . By rough 
estimate ,  this centre of the sugar indust ry produced about 
five million pesos in 19 7 1-72 , in cludin g  ¥469 , 6 82 in property 
taxes , ¥40 , 35 9 in mtmicipal licences , and ¥4 , 02 1 , 636 in BIR 
co llec tions . As suming that the city ab sorbed three-quart ers 
of the to tal amount spent in Dumaguete , it still ended up 
with a surplus of about ¥2 , 000 , 000 . Unfo rtunately , no data 
were obtained on Canlaon except that it provided the BIR 
with only ¥300 , 305 in the same fis cal year . As this amotmt 
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is less than what the BIR mobiliz ed in seve ral of the muni­
cipalit i es , it seems reasonab le to as sume that the third 
and smallest city in the province would at b est have broken 
even . 
The surpluses of  Dumaguete and Bais made the deficit 
fo r the provin ce as a whole - including the cit ies - cons id­
erab ly les s overwhelming.  Nevertheles s , its dependence 
remained severe as the cent ral government st ill had to finance 
about half of  its total expenditure . It must  also be borne 
in mind that almost  80 per cent of  the people of Negros 
Oriental lived outside the cit ies . 
Table 5 . 1 
Mob iliz at ion and expenditure in Negros Oriental , 19 71-72 
Mob ilization Expenditure M/E E /M 
(in pesos ) ( in pesos ) 
Bacong 38 , 85 7  49 7 , 188 0 . 08 12 . 7 9  
Tanj ay 1 , 894 , 2 0 7  2 , 2 08 , 12 3  0 . 86 1 . 17 
Negros Orient al 7 , 5 85 , 5 08 2 7 , 6 83 , 4 35 0 . 2 7 3 .  60 
Dumaguete 4 , 669 , 964 3 , 92 2 , 511 1 . 19 0 . 84 
The 19 71-72 fis cal year was not an unusually depressed 
y ear . Indeed ,  as Table 5 . 2  shows , the mob ilizat ion of 
resources that year was cons iderably more effect ive than in 
19 70-71 . Not only Dumaguete but also the municipalit ies 
colle ct ively achieved significant increases in their to tal 
collect ions . The BIR in part icular was sub stant ially more 
fruitful . Probably as the result of a slump in the sugar 
indus try ,  Tanj ay did actually pro duce less than the preceding 
year . It is noteworthy too that the property tax was a b it 
less pro ductive . The other maj or sources of local revenue -
the municipal licences and t he operat ion of  the pub lic 
ut ilit ies and markets - were much more stab le .  
Not surpris ingly , the maj or expenditures during the 
19 71-72 fis cal year were appreciab ly higher for all the 
localit ies than those in the preceding year . As Tab le 5 . 3  
shows , however , the increases were not dras t ic .  It is notable 
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Tab le 5 .  2 
Resource mob ilizat ion in Negros Oriental ,  
19 70-71 an d  19 71- 72 ( in peso s )  
19 70-71 19 71-72 
Bacong 
Basic property t ax 15 , 6 80 13 , 113  
MlIDicipal licen ces 6 , 44 3  7 , 043  
Pub lic ut ilities /markets 6 , 860 7 , 174 
BIR 6 , 2 4 7  8 , 2 5 6  
Total 35 , 2 30 35 , 586 
Tanj ay 
Bas i c  property tax 112 , 72 7 113 , 783 
MlID.i cipal licences 36 , 047 36 , 7 38 
Public ut ilit ies /market s 136 , 6 79 12 3 , 6 72 
BIR 1 2 66 8 2 02 9  1 , 5 1 7 , 833 
To tal 1 , 9 5 3 2 4 82 1 2 792 , 02 6  
All mlIDici,Ealit ies 
Basic property t ax 790 , 136 7 4 7 , 4 71 
MlIDicipal licences 251 , 2 03 2 61 , 6 72 
Pub lic utilit ies /market s  484 , 566 506 , 69 8  
BIR 3 , 85 3 , 850 4 2 556 , 569 
Total 5 , 379 , 75 5  6 , 0 72 2 410 
Dumaguete 
Bas ic property tax 194 , 012 205 , 483 
MlID.icipal licences 603 , 192 62 8 , 309 
Public ut ilit ies /markets 452 , 5 70 4 6 7 , 5 74 
BIR 1 , 42 7 , 404 1 ,  7 71 , 9 38 
Port and Customs 642 , 5 89 846 , 02 7  
Total 3 , 319 , 76 7  3 , 919 , 331 
that both mob iliz at ionally stagnant Bacong and Tanj ay , which 
actually experien ced a drop in the maj o r  revenues ,  increased 
their expendit ures by arolID.d 15 per cen t .  On the other hand , 
although the comb ined maj or expenditures (budget flID.ds and 
the salaries of  teachers ) o f  the mlID.icipalities  rose  about 
one and a half t imes as fast as the principal revenues , the 
rat io s b etween them fo r the two years remained about the 
same . Assuming the maj or expenditures in Dumaguete in 19 70- 71 
to b e  arolID.d three million pesos , their increase of about 18  
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per cen t fo r 19 71- 72 was about equal to the increase in the 
city ' s  main mob ilized resources . 
Table 5 . 3  
Maj or public expenditure in Negros Oriental 
19 70- 7 1  and 19 71-72 ( in peso s )  
19 70- 7 1  19 71- 72 
Bacong 
Budget funds 82 , 5 16 114 ' 62 7 
Salaries of teachers 2 92 , 204 312 2 836 
Total 374 , 72 0 42 7 , 463 
Tanj ay 
Budget funds 7 39 , 306 92 0 , 85 6 
Salaries o f  trachers 1 , 056 , 706 1 , 164 , 796  
Tot al 1 , 796 , 012 2 , 085 ! 652 
The :erovince EroEer 
�unicipal budget funds 4 , 62 0 , 884 5 , 655 , 3 75 
Salaries of  teachers 10 , 006 , 62 2  11 , 762 , 3 76 
Provincial budget funds 4 , 38 7 , 806 5 , 505 , 439 
BPH 1 , 39 7 , 966 2 , 2 13 '  403 
Total 20 , 413 , 2 7 8  2 5 , 136 , 5 93 
Dumaguete a Budget funds 2 , 084 , 436 2 , 410 , 6 7 7  
Salaries o f  teachers n/a 7 7 7 ' 686 
BPH 2 03 , 5 73 341 , 08 7  
Total 3 , 52 9 , 450 
a This amount may differ slightly from the actual amount 
it includes only the budgete d ,  rather t h an  the actual , 
amount in the general fund . 
as 
Sin ce neither the resources nor the expenditures during 
1971- 7 2  were except ional , the enormous deficits incurred that 
year by the municipalities and the province as a whole must  
be  taken as  reliably indicative of  the  grave ext ent of their 
dependen ce . Given this situat ion , a high degree o f  central­
izat ion was basi cally unavoidab le .  The decentralist s may 
nevertheless argue that t he level of centraliz at ion should 
not , at leas t , exceed that o f  dependen ce .  
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Lacking complete data on Bais and Canlaon , we can only 
evaluate the degree o f  centralizat ion with regard to the 
provin ce prop er . Although Dumaguete was not a dependen t 
city , it  is use ful to delineate the extent of the role of 
the cen tral government there . As mo st of the surplus in 
Bais was mob ilized by the national government through the 
BIR, a conservat ive es timate of  the level of  centralizat ion 
for the province as a whole - including the cities - may also 
be ob tained s imply by in tegrat ing the capital city with the 
province proper . 
S ince the Bureau of Internal Revenue was the only 
mob iliz ing agency of the cen tral governmen t in the munici­
pali t i es , it s co llect ion of  ¥4 , 556 , 569 (Tab le 3 . 2 ) from the 
twen ty-two mun icipalities in Negros Orien tal const ituted the 
aggregate of the cent rally mobilized re sources of these 
individual units . Together with the provin ce-wide co llect ions 
by the Moto r Vehicles Office , the branches of  the Cour t of  
the First Inst an ce ,  and the Regist rar of  Deeds ( Table 3 . 3) ,  
the nat ional governmen t mob ilized a tot al of ¥5 , 4 71 , 07 4  in 
19 71-7 2 . As the mob ilized resources came to ¥7 , 5 85 , 5 08 in 
all , i t  was respons ib le for 72 per cent o f  the mob ilizational 
effort in the province . In other words , it was more than 
two and a half times as active as the municipal and the pro­
vincial governmen ts together . 
The central government was considerab ly less dominant 
with r egard to the expenditures . In  addit ion to the 
¥12 , 69 8 , 9 17 fo r the salaries of teachers and the personnel 
of the j udicial , medical , agricultural ext ens ion , and 
community development services within the individual mun ici­
palit ies ,  it gene rally dispensed ¥2 , 681 , 417 primarily through 
the Bureau of Pub lic Highways (BPH) . Given the fact that 
pub lic expendit ures in the province proper added up to 
¥27 , 6 83 , 435 (Table 4 . 3 ) ,  the direct con tribut ion of the 
nat ional governmen t was only s light ly larger than the 
aggregate spent by the local governments . 
One way o f  measuring the level of dependence of a lo cal 
connnunity is to divide it s deficit by it s total mob ilized 
revenue . Similarly , the ext ent of centralizat ion may be  
taken as  the quot ient between the effort o f  the central 
government and that of the lo cal author ity concerned . From 
this perspective , it is obvious that for Negros Orien tal as 
a provin ce ,  the degree of local dependence is greater than 
the extent of cen tralizat ion . As Table 5 . 1 shows , the 
deficit incurred by the province amounted to more than two 
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and a half times the product of mobiliz ation within it . 
That the centra l  government also mobiliz ed more than two and 
a half times as much as the local governments  should be less 
important to  the decentralist s  than the fact that it  was 
much less act ive with regard to the expenditures . At any 
rate , taken together the amounts mobil ized and spen t  directly 
by the nat ional agencies were only one and a half t imes 
those handled by the local authorities . 
As in the province , the nat ional governmen t was a much 
more active agent of resource mobilization in Dumaguete than 
the city government itself . Collecting only 63 per cent of 
the t otal revenue of the city ( Tab le 3 . 4 ) , however , the 
nat ional agencies mobilized proport ionately much less than 
they d id in the province . With regard to  the expenditures , 
those of the city government which came to ¥2 , 410 , 6 7 7  were 
actually more than one and a half t imes those of the central 
government (Table 4 . 4 ) .  Cons equently ,  the city government 
mob iliz ed and spent almost exactly as much as the nat ional 
agencies . 
The relatively low level of cen tralization in Dumaguete 
probab ly made Negros Oriental as a whole subj ect to less 
centralization than the province proper . The dif ference ,  
however , was unlikely t o  b e  considerable . As Tab le 5 . 4  
shows , alt ogether the nat ional government collected and 
directly expended in Dumaguete and the province 41 per cen t  
( as compared to 5 2  per cen t  in the provin ce alone) mo re than 
the local governments  concerned collectively . Although 
Bais was also a surplus city like Dumaguet e ,  it cannot be 
expected to have cont ributed to further lowering the ext ent 
of  centralizat ion with regard to  the region as a whole . As 
noted earlier , i ts surplus was the result largely of its 
except ionally l arge BIR co llect ion which constitut ed no less 
than 80 per cent of  its total mob ilized revenue . 
It is  clear , then , that the degree o f  cen tralization in 
Negros Oriental was less than the extent of it s dependence . 
The proponents of decentralization may nevertheless argue 
that it is st ill unaccept ab ly high . It seems reasonable 
that the surplus communities like Dumaguete should be given 
more autonomy . There is also no fundamental reason why the 
central government should not refrain altogether from directly 
mob ilizing and spending pub lic resources even within the 
dependent lo cal politics . The insis tence on local autonomy 
for it s own s ake , however , is not really defensib le .  Surely 
50 
Tab le 5 . 4  
Level of centraliz ation in Negros Oriental , 19 7 1-72 
The province 
proper 
Mobilizat ion 
Expenditure 
Total 
Dumaguete 
Mobilization 
Expendi ture 
Total 
Province and 
Dumaguete 
Mobilization 
Expenditure 
Tot al 
Total 
(in pesos ) 
7 , 5 85 , 508 
2 7 , 6 8 3 , 435 
35 , 2 6 8 , 943  
4 , 669 , 964 
3 , 922 , 5 11 
8 , 592 , 4 75 
12 , 2 55 , 4 72 
3 1 , 605 , 946  
43 , 86 1 , 418 
Local 
( in peso s )  
2 , 114 , 434 
11 , 903 , 101 
14 , 017 , 5 35 
1 , 722 , 7 85 
2 , 45 3 , 2 2 5  
4 , 17 6 , 010 
3 , 837 , 7 19 
14 , 356 , 32 6  
1 8 , 194 , 045 
Central-
National izat ion 
( in pesos )  (national/ 
local) 
5 , 4 7 1 , 0 74 
15 , 7 80 , 334 
2 1 , 251 , 40 8  
2 , 9 4 7 , 179  
1 , 469 , 2 86 
4 , 416 , 465 
8 , 418 , 2 5 3  
17 , 2 49 , 62 0  
25 , 66 7 , 8 7 3  
2 . 5 9  
1 .  3 3  
1 . 52 
1 .  7 1  
0 . 60 
1 . 05 
2 . 19 
1 . 2 0 
1 . 41 
the overriding cons iderat ion is the adequate provis ion of 
polit ical good s to the people which in turn demands the 
mob ilization of adequate resources . Unless greater autonomy 
can be  shown to result in a more effective collection and 
expenditure of resources , the demand for it is not very 
relevant .  Indeed , the convent ional debate b etween the 
cent ralists  and the decen tralists  has been rather meaningless ,  
i f  not downright harmful , as it has only befogged the basic 
is sue of local dependence and decay . In the f inal analys is , 
it should not really mat ter who mobiliz es and spends the 
resources . The urgent necess ity is that the mobilized 
revenues should be adequate and the expenditures effect ive . 
Chap ter 6 
The n at ional picture and the significance 
of  administ rat ive reform 
From the preceding chapters it is clear that Negros 
Oriental was very underdeveloped politically . The amo\lllt 
of polit i cal goods availab le t o  the people in the province 
was decidedly meagre . Moreover , even this amount was con­
siderably beyond the capacity of the province to provide 
from its  own resources . 
Considering the fact that Negros Oriental was among the 
poorer provin ces in the co\llltry , it s level of polit ical 
development may not be regarded as indicat ive of the situation 
in the nat ion as a whole . Unfo rtunately , we do not have 
adequate comparative data for other provinces . The available 
dat a ,  however ,  strongly suggest that Negros Oriental was not 
at all exceptional . Severe underdevelopment was evidently 
a nat ion-wide predicament . 
Polit ical goods 
On pub lic health , the Office of the Pres ident acknowledged 
that in 19 6 7  only ' about 48% of t he population is being 
served with water through t he exist ing waterworks , ar tes ian 
wells , and developed natural springs ' (Philippines , 19 6 7 : 2 4) . 
It also poin ted out that of  the 1330 rural health units 
throughout the co\llltry , only 330 were fully staffed and 
equipped (p . 2 9 ) . A study on the provincial government o f  
Nueva Ecij a in Central Luzon , conducted b y  the Local Govern­
ment Center (LGC) of the College of Public Administration , 
the University o f  the Philippines ,  revealed that only 3 per 
cent of the people in the province were served by water 
systems in 19 68 ; the rest were dependent on rain , springs , 1 
deepwells , bamboo aqueducts ,  and other sources (LGC 1968 : 3) . 
1This st udy is part of a very useful series on provincial , 
city and muni cipal governments conducted by the Center on 
the request and with the co-op eration o f  the local govern­
men t s  concerned . Unfort\lllately they are narrowly focused 
on the organiz at ion and management of these tlllit s .  
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Even the municipalit ies within the Greater Manila metro­
politan area seemed to  suffer from very inadequate health 
services . In San Juan which had f ive health centres in 196 9 , 
the main clinic locat ed in the mun icipal health office in 
the municipal building was on ly a small cubicle ' without 
rtmning water , bas in or toilet ' (LGC 1969c : l4 4 ) . The nearby 
mun icipality of Pasig was a b it better off with nineteen 
health centres for its twen ty-ei ght barrios in 19 7 1 .  These 
centres , however , were far from adequate ;  while the main one 
was congested and dirty , the rest simply ' lack the necessary 
supplies , medicine , and equipment ' .  This same municipality 
had only three operat ing garbage dump t rucks which could 
serve only the pob lacion (LGC 19 7 1 : 118 , 12 0-1 �  85 ) . 
As sugges ted in Chapter 2 ,  one indication of the 
adequacy of the provision o f  j ustice is the size of the 
backlog of cases in the courts . In the country ' s  f ift een 
j udicial districts of  the Court of  First  Instance (excluding 
Man ila) alone there were in total 7 1 , 134 cases pending as of 
30 June 1969  (JPS 19 7 l : Table 8 . 4 ,  p . 8 7 ) . Since only a small 
percentage of cases was likely to reach this level from the 
city and municipal courts , this f igure greatly underst ates 
the magnitude of the backlog accumulated by the j udicial 
sys tem.  
Again the s ituat ion within the Metropo lit an Manila area 
may give an idea of the capacity of the j udiciary at the 
municipal level . As of October 197 0 ,  for examp le ,  there were 
3560 cases , mostly criminal , : pending at the municipal court 
in Pas ig (LGC 19 7 1 : 76) . At the city level , it has b een 
reported that in Davao only 59 per cent of the new cases 
filed during the 1968-69 fiscal year were disposed of  and 
that by 30 June 1969 the accumulated cases pending at the 
city court numb ered almost 5000 ( LGC 19 7 0b : 2 2 0 ) . 
The weaknes s of the courts was mat ched by the inadequacy 
of the police departmen ts . In Pasig, only about 50 per cent 
of the reported crimes against property during the three-year 
period from 19 6 7  to 19 69 were solved by the police (LGC 197 1 :  
9 5 ) . A s imilar level of performan ce prevailed in Davao where 
only 55  per cent of the t otal numb er of crimes reported during 
the same period were cleared (LGC 1970b : l40) . 
In terms of roads , Negros Oriental was clearly better 
off than the country as a whole which had an average of less 
than two kilometres per �OOO he ctares (LGC 1968 : 3 ) . It is 
generally known , however ,  that roads were very unequally 
53 
dist ributed throughout the archipelago , with Luzon and 
Mindanao being the most  and the least well-endowed respect­
ively . Hence in the province of Nueva Ecij a in central Luzon , 
for instance, the rat io was in 19 68 34 km per 1000 ha (LGC 
1968 : 3 ) .  
Nevertheless even around Man ila the provis ion of roads 
was far from adequate .  In the mun icipal it ies o f  Pasig and 
San Juan already referred to  above , the cond it ion of the 
municipal roads in part icular was a constan t  source of popular 
complaint . Although nearly all the barrios in Pasig were 
connected with roads , ' a  great length of these roads are 
poo rly maintained , part icularly . • . out side the town prop er ' 
(LGC 19 7 1 : 83) . Similarly , the municipal roads in San Juan 
' are narrow, of gravel or macadam pavement , an d not con st ructed 
according to technical and safety st andards ' (LGC 1969c : l60) . 
Resource mob ilization 
The impression that dependence was also characteristic 
of most  of the Philippine provinces was amply supported by 
data on the level of resource mob ili zation in the provin ce 
of Negros Occidental . Being the cen tre of the sugar indust ry ,  
this was unquest ionably one of  the richest provinces in the 
count ry .  In fact , the affluen ce o f  it s provincial government 
was s e cond only t o  that o f  Riz al which covered parts of 
Met ropolitan Manila. According to one dependable report 
(LGC : l9 7 3 ) , the provincial government of Negros Occidental 
received an average . annual income o f  �12 , 5 12 , 515 during the 
three-year period from 1969 to 19 71 .  This was almost four 
t imes the median income amon g the s ixty-six provincial 
governments outs ide Manila and almost three t imes that o f  
Negros Oriental which nevertheless ranked twenty-second in 
the group . With respect to the number of motor vehicles , 
Negros Occidental was again one o f  the richest  provinces , 
next on ly to  Riz al and Pampanga . In 19 70 , it had six and a 
half and four t imes as many regist ered mo tor vehicles as the 
median province and Negros Oriental respect ively (JPS 19 7 1 :  
Table 5 . 8 ,  p . 49 ) . 
In view o f  this obvious wealth , it is not surprising that 
the municipalities of Negros Occident al were capable of pro­
ducing almos t eight t imes as much in resources as those o f  
it s s is ter province during the 19 7 1-72 fis cal year . Signifi­
cantly , as Table 6 . 1  shows , the Bureau o f  Internal Revenue 
in Negros Occidental was relatively even more product ive than 
the municipal governments . As the B IR mob iliz ed most of the 
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resources from the sugar indust ry ,  this reflected the 2 indus t ry ' s  well-known dominance in the provincial economy . 
Tab le 6 . 1 
Mob ilized mu..�icipal re sources in Negros Orien tal 
and Negros Occ idental , 19 7 1-72 ( in pesos)  
Own mob ilizat ion 
B IR 
Total 
Negros Oriental 
1 , 9 59 , 313 
4 , 556 , 569  
6 , 5 15 , 882 
Negro s Occident al 
10 , 374 , 2 88 
41 , 59 3 , 6 7 1  
5 1 , 9 6 7 , 959  
Sources : The of fi ces o f  provincial treasurers in Negros 
Oriental and Negro s Occ i dental .  
In addit ion t o  the amounts in Table 6 . 1 ,  the provincial 
government actually brought in a total o f  �1 , 111 , 015 in 
inciden tal revenues . Sin ce the provincial income from the 
Motor Vehicle Office amotm ted to ¥754 , 9 61 in Negros Orien tal 
(Table 3 . 3 ) , the revenue from this source in Negros Occidental 
may b e  estimated , on the basis of it s relat ively much larger 
number of  regis tered moto r vehicles , to be  arotmd ¥ 3 , 000 , 000 . 
Finally , the proceeds from the regis t ration of deeds and court 
collect ions , which came to ¥159 , 5 35 in Negros Orien tal , may 
be put at about ¥333 , 000 in view of  the populat ion rat io 
between the two provinces . All in all , then ,  resource mob il­
izat ion in Negros Occidental , out s ide the chartered cities , 
may be  estimated to have produced about ¥56 , 400 , 000 during 
the 19 7 1-72 fiscal y ear . 
Despit e  this impressive record , it is not clear that 
Negro s Occident al could b e  adequately self-supporting . 
Unfortunately , we have no dat a on pub lic expenditures in the 
province similar to those for Negros Oriental .  It is important 
to note,  however , that Negros Occidental was s lightly more 
than twice as populous as Negros Oriental , their populat ions 
2 The provin ce has a total land area of 792 , 607 ha. According 
to the o ffice of the governor , 364 , 6 88 ha were planted to 
sugarcane in 19 7 2 . 
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in 19 70 being 1 , 49 1 , 737  and 715 , 2 40 respect ively (LGC 19 7 3) . 
During the 19 6 7-6 8 s chool year , the 644 1 p rimary and element ary 
school teachers serving in Negros Occidental were also more 
than twice as numerous as the ir colleagues in Negros Oriental 
who numbered only 3086 (JPS 19 70 : Table 3 . 1 ,  p . 16 ) . Since 
more than 42 per cen t  o f  the t otal expenditure in Negros 
Oriental was allocated for the salaries of the t eachers , this 
latter fact is very suggest ive of the comparab le public outlay 
in Negro s Occidental . 
Assuming the provision of  polit ical goods to b e  at the 
same level in the two adj acent provinces , then , it seems 
reasonab le to est imate the tot al pub lic expend it ure in Negros 
Occidental to be at least twice that in Negros Oriental . 
As the latter amounted to ¥27 , 6 83 , 435 ( Tab le 4 . 3 ) , there 
appears to  be lit tle reason to expect Negros Occidental to  
have b een more than b reaking even . 
The picture of the Philippines painted by the preceding 
sections is that of a cotm.try the  great maj ority of  whose 
citizens were deprived of adequate polit ical goods and were , 
at the same t ime , incapab le on their own of producing the 
resources neces sary for the provis ion of such goods . In 
19 7 0 ,  only 7 , 607 , 744 or about 2 1  per cen t  out of  36 , 6 84 , 500 
Filipinos were living in the sixty-one chartered cit ies (LGC 
19 7 3 ) . Even assuming that the cit ies were generally self­
support ing and were therefore capable of  rais ing the level 
of their polit i cal development , the problem of such development 
in terms of the nat ion as a whole appeared to be staggering.  
Administrat ive and managerial capab ility 
This prob lem of t oo few polit ical goods and too lit t le 
resources could to some extent be  alleviated by improvement 
in the administrat ive and managerial capab ility of the local 
governments  themselves as well as the central government 
agencies which operat ed in their areas . Such improvement 
could have rais ed the effic iency of  both resource expenditure 
and resource mob ilizat ion . 
A given amount of pub lic expenditure may obviously p roduce 
different quantities of polit ical goo ds , depending on the 
care with which it :i.s made . In this regard , perhaps the 
most  commonly heard charge against the lo cal government s  as 
well as the central government agencies serving them was 
that they wer<� wasteful . In particular , they were said to 
5 6  
be spending t o o  much o f  their funds for the salaries and 
benefit s of their over-abundant per sonnel . To dis courage 
this particular form of was tefulness , there was in existence 
a special legis lat ion which s pecified the maximum portions 
of  the budget s of provinces and cit ies of  different ranks 
expendable for salaries and wages (LGC 19 7 0a : 24 ) . 
Apparent ly ,  this law was very widely , if not universally , 
ignored . For example , while it was legally allowed to set 
as ide only up to 55 per cent o f  it s general fund for the 
remunerat ion of its employees , the government o f  Negros 
Orient al actually spent for this purpose more than 61 per 
cent of  that fund during 19 71- 7 2 . In Batan gas , a provin ce 
with the same rank, the provincial government allo cated 
slight ly mo re than 64 per cent (LGC 1972 a : 89 ,  9 3 ) . The 
cities were not any more law-abiding.  In both 19 7 0-71  and 
19 71-72 fiscal years , Dumaguete appropriated mo re than 10 
per cent of it s general fund in excess of its legal limit 
o f  60  per cent . Similarly , Dagupan , another second-class 
city , spent an average of almost 76 per cent during the four­
year period b etween 19 6 6  and 19 69 (LGC 1969b : 7 5 ) . 
Quit e clearly , there was some room for improving the 
efficiency of resource expenditure , and hence increasing the 
availab ility of po lit ical goods within the local government 
units with the exist ing level of resource mob ilizat ion . 
There seemed , moreover , to b e  an even greater poten tial to 
enhancing that level it sel f .  In general , it had been noted 
that the Philippines had been quit e lax in its t ax e ffort , 
even in comparison with other As ian co untries (Philippines 
1969 : ix) . 
Of the main res ources directly mob ilizable by the local 
governments , the real property tax was the most important 
to the municipalities and hence the provinces proper . The 
biggest  source of income af ter the allotments from the central 
government ,  it constituted , for example , 9 per cent and 1 6  
per cent o f  the 1971- 72 general funds o f  Negro s Oriental and 
Negros Occ ident al resp ect ively . In Batangas , it made up 
more than 14 per cent of the revenues in all the provincial 
funds comb ined (LGC 19 72a : Appendix 1 3 ,  p . 85 ) . Unfortunately , 
the mobilization of this t ax had been hampered by lax 
collection and defective assessment . 
The provincial treasurer of Negros Oriental reportedly 
complained in 19 70 that the p rovincial government could only 
collect about 50 per cent of all the t axes due to it (Negros 
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Express 2 6 /9 / 70 : 1) . Although startling , this admiss ion did 
not indicate a part icularly poor performan ce on the part of  
the province relat ive to  other provinces . From 1964 t o  
196 8 ,  Nueva Ecij a was able to  mob ilize barely 25 p e r  cent 
of its collectable real-est ate tax annually (LGC 19 68 : 35) . 
For Batangas , the 19 7 0- 7 1  record s tood at less than 3 7  per 
cen t ( LGC 19 72a : 53) . Of the 49  municipalit ies in Leyte ,  
only 1 7  collected more than 5 0  per cent of the taxes due in 
19 66- 6 7  while 13 achieved less than 30 per cent mobilizat ion . 
The same report on Leyte comments : ' Tax delinquency cases 
are most ly from three to five years b ack , although some are 
as late as 1948 or even b efore the second World War ' (LGC 
1969 a : 79 , 84) . Only a slightly better performance was achieved 
by the province of Pangasinan which collected an average of 
almost 58 per cent of  all the current an d  delinquent taxes 
during the six-year period from 1966 to 19 71 (LGC 1972b : 2 59 ) . 
Contrary to what might be expected , the municipalities 
closes t  to Manila did not seem to be  except ionally active . 
In Pasig,  for example , the collect ions during the 19 66 to  
1969 p eriod were less than the amount left  uncollected (LGC 
19 71 : 22 3) . 
Since the amount co llectable from the property taxes 
depended upon their asses sment , it s total potential mob il­
iz ation was determined by the level , accuracy , and coverage 
of the latter . It was generally acknowledged that these 
it ems were all very unsatisfactory . 
Very few lo cal . governments  had begun to apply the latest 
asses sment rates adopted by the Department of  Finance in 
1964 . Instead , mo st were st ill continuing to base their 
assessment of property values on a s chedul e established in 
194 8 .  Sin ce even the new rates were estimated to peg valu­
at ion of real properties at only about 50 per cen t  of their 
current fair market values , the prevailing levels of assess­
ment t ended to  be very low . 
While refusing to offer any est imate ,  the office of  the 
provincial assessor of Negros Oriental admit ted that the 
level of valuat ion in the province , which was st ill generally 
based on the 1948 rat es , could be raised quite sub st an tially . 
Of the four other provinces already referred to above , Leyte 
and Batangas seemed to b e  the most  generous to their property 
owners . While mo st of  the municipalit ies in the former were 
impos ing merely 15 per cent assessment in 1969 (LGC 1969a : 9 7 ) , 
the general level o f  valuat ion in the latter was only 1 7  per 
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cent in 19 72 (LGC 19 72a : 52 ) . The comparab le percentages 
for P an gasinan and Nueva Ecij a were 30 ( in 19 72 ) and 3 7  ( in 
19 78)  respectively ( LGC 19 72b : 2 5 6 ;  LGC 19 6 8 : 35 ) . Again the 
municipalit ies around Manila were no more assertive . In 
San Juan , for in stance , the average as ses sment level for 
the di fferent types of lan ds in 1969 was est imated to be 
only about 2 1  per cent of their market values (LGC 1969c : 6 8) . 
With respect to  their accuracy and coverage , the valu­
at ion effo rts of the var ious lo cal governmen t s  showed several 
short comings . Perhaps the most  widespread of  these was the 
adminis trat ive neglect of proper re cord keeping and co­
ordinat ion between the asses sment and collect ion funct ions . 
A much mo re serious defect which also appeared to be common 
was the exclusion o f  subst antial amounts o f  property from 
the tax rolls (Mariano 19 69 : 462 ) . In Batan gas , for example , 
almost a third of the total land area es caped t axat ion in 
19 72 ( LGC 19 72a : 52 ) . In part , this undes irable state o f  
affairs s imply reflect ed the inab ility o f  the lo cal govern­
ments to identify all the taxab le propert ies wit hin their 
j urisdi ct ions . Another contribut ing factor was the well­
known tendency of the tax co de to be ext raordinarily generous 
in its grant of exempt ion to various categories of property 
owners . Finally , it was common knowledge that ext ens ive 
real es tates had b een delib erately hidden and protected f rom 
taxat ion . 
The poor performance of the local governments  as 
exemplified by their collect ion of real-estate t axes could 
be t aken as a j ustificat ion fo r further cen tralizat ion of 
the resource mob ilization funct ion . There was , however ,  
also a widespread suspicion that t he cen tral iz ed collect ion 
of the numerous internal revenue taxes which const ituted the 
b ulk of the mob iliz able resources ( Tab le 6 . 1 ) was far from 
b e ing sat is factory . The t roub le is that , for various reasons , 
no est imate of  the level o f  it s ef fect iveness was available . 
Incident ally , some suggest ive data b ecame available as 
the result o f  the declarat ion of  mart ial law toward the end 
of Sept ember 1972 . Since the New Society was supposed to 
bring about a drast ic improvement in the governmen tal per­
fo rmance , the increase in tax collection immediately following 
its advent may b e  regarded as indicat ive o f  its  mobiliz at ion 
pot en tial . 
As Table 6 . 2  shows , the re were indeed substant ial 
increases in both the property t axes and int ernal revenues 
Tab le 6 .  2 
Collect ion o f  property t axes and internal revenues 
in t he municipalit ies of Negros Oriental and Negros 
Occident al , before and after mart ial law ( in peso s)  
Basic property taxes 1 9 7 1  19 72 % 
(current ) ( Oct . -Dec . )  (Oct . -Dec . )  increase 
Negros Oriental 111 , 3 71 2 06 , 766 86 
Negros Occidental 388 , 961 5 64 , 916 45 
Internal revenues Oct . 19 71- Oct . 1972- % 
April 1972  April 1973  increase 
Negros Orien tal 1 , 6 84 , 504 1 , 8 78 , 059 11 
Negros Occidental 1 7 , 358 , 7 5 3  36 , 451 , 842 109 
Source : Regional Office , BIR, Bacolod City . 
in the two Negros provinces during the first seven months 
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of the new regime compared to the same period the previous 
year . From the experience of these two p rovinces , it would 
be dif ficult  to argue that the B IR had been more effect ive 
than the lo cal governments . Int riguingly , it had been 
relat ively more efficient in the poorer province (Negros 
Oriental)  which itself was relat ively a much weaker mobil izer .  
This suggest s  that �he wealthier provin ces were more able 
not only to mobilize resources on their own but also to 
prevent mob ilization by othe rs . 3 
All in all , there seems to be  some validity in the 
advo cacy of admini strative reform as a prerequis it e  t o  
development . B y  maximiz ing the effi �iency of  both expenditure 
and resource mob ilizat ion , such reform would conceivab ly 
reduce substant ially the severe dependence of the local unit s , 
part icularly the mun icipalities and provinces . Beyond this , 
however ,  there would st ill b e  the urgent n eed t o  increase 
substantially the quant ity and quality of the polit ical 
goods . Administ rat ive reform alone cannot possibly meet 
this as well . 
3It is obvious ly more difficult to  collect t axes from small 
property owners than from affluent landlords . On the o ther 
hand , the in crease in the B IR collect ion in Negros Occidental 
could substantially be t raced t o  t ax amnesty granted by the 
mart ial law administration to owners of hitherto hidden wealth . 
Chapt er 7 
The political economy of  concentration and s t agnat ion 
The fundamental obs tacle to polit ical development is 
clearly the bas ic economic condition o f  the rural areas . 
Given the general poverty of the rural populat ion , no amount 
o f  administ rat ive t inkerin g could pos s ibly pro duce enough 
resources to augment the supply of  pol it ical goods adequately . 
Rural stagnat ion 
Unfortun ately , the rural e conomy had in fact been 
deteriorat ing .  In 1960 , the share of  the t radit ional sector 
in the GNP , for example , was 2� . l  per cent (Hicks and 
McNicoll 1971 : 44 ) . At about the same t ime ,  the proport ion 
of labour in agriculture was more than 70 per cent (Power 
an d Sicat 19 71 : 20) . While the lat ter did not chan ge appre­
ciably , both the GNP share and the percen tage of employed 
labour fo rce of the t radit ional sector declined as shown 
in Tab le 7 .  L 
Table 7 . 1  
GNP and employment shares of the t radit ional sector 
GNP Employed labour 
1960 2 4 . 1 60 . 2  
1964 2 2 . 7  5 7 . 1  
1968  21 .  5 5 6 . 5  
Source : Hicks an d  McNicoll ( 19 7 1 ,  Table 3 ,  p . 44 and 
Table 7 , p . 52 ) . 
force 
The main reason fo r this dismal state of affairs is the 
stagnat ion of agricultural product ivity . As Frank Golay has 
ob served ( Golay 1961 : 2 89) , agricultural product ion per head 
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o f  populat ion in the last 19 60s was 
a lit t le improved over l evels at tained prior to  
World War II . . •  [ even though ] agricultural output 
has grown st eadily from the low wartime levels of  
1944  and 1945 . The increase in agricultural 
output since the late interwar period has not been 
due t o  in creases in product ivit y of ei.ther land or  
labo ur but to expansion in land under cult ivat ion . 
At the same t ime , there was no significant expansion 
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of rural non-agricultural ac t ivit ies .  ' What is part icularly 
not iceable in the Philippines is the relat ive ab sence of 
small factories in the rural areas an d  small towns ' ( !LO 
19 74 : 64) . 
It is apparen t that both stagnant product ivity and 
anaemic rural industrializat ion were in turn the result o f  
very inadequate attent ion . With regard t o  expenditures on 
infrast ructural development , for example , only slightly more 
than half (52 . 5  per cen t )  of the to tal investment b etween 
1965 and 19 72 was allo cated to all the other provinces bes ides 
Rizal (which includes Manila) and Central Luz on ( !LO 19 74 : 
86 an d  196) . Only ve ry meagre inst itutional support had 
been given to non-agricultural act ivit ies ( !LO 1974 : 86 ) . 
This inat tent ion was only symptomatic . The problem is 
not s imple ne glect but the very st ructure of the nat ional 
economy it self . 
Met ropolitan concent rat ion 
In con trast to the rural stagnat ion and anaemia, there 
had been an overwhelming concentrat ion of economic act ivit ies 
in Manila and its surrounding area.  At the end of  the 1960s 
and the beginning o f  this de cade , ' about two-thirds of the 
value-added from the o rganized manufacturing sector ' ,  for 
example , was ' accounted for by est ablishment s in Met ropolit an 
Manila and the Southern Luzon region ' (Power and Sicat 19 71 : 
106) . In terms of employment in the same sector , the area 
claimed about 80 per cent ( !LO 19 74 : 154) . During the five­
year period between 1956 and 1960 , Met ropolitan Manila 
(Manila proper and sub urb s )  alone ' accounted for about half 
of all reporting establishments and total employment ,  slightly 
less than half of total value-added ,  and slightly more than 
half of the total value of produc t s  sol d '  ( Sicat 1964 : 19 6 ) . 
Ten years lat er it st ill con sumed ' 90 per cent of  the nat ion ' s  
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elect rical energy and [housed ] hal f of the nat ion ' s  manu­
facturin g  activity '  (Burley 1 9 7 3 : 13 ) . 
As a result  o f  this concent rat ion , there was under­
standably a dramatic income inequality b etween the met ro­
politan centre and the res t of the country .  In 19 6 8 , 40 per 
cent of the nat ional income was enj oyed by the Man ilans who 
constituted only 4 per cent o f  the populat ion (Villegas 
1970 : 2 4 7 ) . Put differently , the average income in metropol itan 
Manila around that time was almo st four t imes the rural 
average (Power and S icat 19 71 : 65) . Three years later , the 
median family income in Manila was more than twi ce that for 
the country as a whole ( !LO 19 74 : Tab le 69 , p . 3 7 8 ) . 
Economic structure 
Such stark imbalan ce in the economy could not be acci­
dental . In this case , it was largely the re sult  of  a peculiar 
relationship b etween import-subst itut ion industrialization 
and cont inuing reliance on the export of primary and semi­
pro cessed pro duct s of agriculture , mining and forestry . 
Tradit ionally dominant , the lat ter act ivity st ill accounted 
for no les s than 70 per cent o f  the tot al export earn ings 
durin g the decade of the sixt ies (Power and Sicat 1971 : 105 ) . 
It was this source which largely fuelled the concerted 
indust rializat ion drive b egun in the early f ift ies . 
To make the drive highly profitable and thus att ract ive , 
it was generously supported not only by protect ion but also 
by low rat es of interest , over-evaluat ion of the currency 
and s everal other fis cal advant ages . Such measures naturally 
result ed in the predominance o f  highly capital-intensive 
manufacturing activit ie s .  Given the foreign-exchange form 
o f  the available capit al , the indus� ries were in no need of 
domest ically produced input s and were in fact heavily dependen t  
on import s not only in capit al equipment b ut also in materials 
and intermediate goo ds . The fact that the capital ownership 
was also highly con centrated finally meant that the indust rial 
estab l ishments tended to b e  large . Thus , it was found that 
firms with 200 or more employees were responsible for more 
than 50 per cent and 70 per cent respect ively of the total 
employment and value-added in manuf acturing ( ILO 1 9 74 : 142 ) . 
The pre dominance o f  large-s cale , capit al- intensive , and 
import-dependent indust ries unavo idably meant concentrat ion . 
To ensure a dependable flow o f  their undervalued imported 
input s ,  the indust ries nat urally favoured lo cat ion near a 
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principal port . They obviously also favoured the convergence 
of powe r ,  t ranspo rt , f inanc ial and other facil it ies not only 
for convenience b ut for th e great er re sul t ing external 
economies as well . As the industrializ at ion proceeded , the 
demand for the infrast ructural services in creased , leading 
to the expans ion of  these services which further augmented 
their att raction . The increasing concent rat ion of  economic 
activit ies naturally brought about , and was further re inforced 
by , con siderab le income growth which , together with the 
influx of innnigran ts from th e rural areas , provided an 
increas ing market demand for the manufactured goods . At the 
same t ime , educat ional and cultural in stitut ion s mushroomed , 
different ially catering to the needs of the economic elit e 
and the urban mass , and giving pol ish and glit ter to the 
li fe of the metropolis . 
The fact tha t  Manila had always been the t rading as well 
as polit ical centre of the archipelago only mean t that it 
inevitab ly cont inued to be the commanding metropolitan 
capit al . Its initial advantages accelerated and accentuated 
the concen trative process . While Man ila was thus destined 
to be the fo cus of economic act ivit ies , it is equally clear 
that the regions were doomed to stagnat ion . Highly capital­
intens ive manufacturin g  obviously could not provide much 
employment opportunity to help absorb the rural-unemployed , 
although the b right met ropolit an light s and interstit ial 
service employment did attract cons iderable emigrat ion out 
of the rural areas . Rural in dust rializ at ion was dis couraged 
not only by the lack. of demand for domest ic input s by the 
import-dependen t manufacturing establishment s but also by 
their overwhelming comp et it ive advantage . In other words , 
small-scale rural indust ries clearly had lit tle funct ion to 
perform and neither means nor room to  expand. 
Even the primary export sector did not really involve 
much of the productive capacity of the countrys ide , except 
land. Being con centrated and self-cont ained , the mines , 
the estates and the lo gging camps could not st imulat e wide­
rangin g productive impulses . They certainly did not require 
or even encourage much investment in irrigat ion , roads and 
oth er rural infrast ructures . 
In summary , metropolitan concen t ration and rural stag­
nat ion were equally int egral aspect s of the post-independence 
Philippine economy . Bein g  the consequen ces of the same 
forces , namely th e continuing reliance on primary export and 
the import-subst itut ion indust rializ at ion largely fuelled by 
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it , they were necessar ily parallel and ,  to  some exten t , 
mut ually r einforcing . 
Nevertheless , it  may s till be argued that the basic 
economic structure out lined above does not inherently prevent 
economic growth . After all , it is not comp letely unreasonable 
to expect that expanding industrialization would eventually 
produce significant spill-over or trickling benefit s  for the 
res t of the economy .  Hence , the rural areas could st ill 
slowly emerge from b eing simply a captured market and a 
spectator  to become a product ive participant in the develop­
ment p ro cess . 
Unfortunately ,  this opt imistically assumes that the 
indus t rializat ion would not only cont inue to e::\:pand substan­
tially over quit e a long period but also broaden its  base 
beyond import-sub stitut ion . This assumpt ion is not very 
tenable .  In the first p lace , becaus e of their instability 
the primary exports could not be depended on to propel the 
industrializat ion drive to the po int when it could b egin to 
be self-sustaining through substant ial ut ilizat ion and pro­
duct ion of domes t ic inputs or the ability to earn foreign 
exchange from manufactured export s .  Hence it was ' a  rapid 
growth of tradit ional exports . . .  that made the foreign 
exchange posit ion viab le b etween 1960 and 1966 ' and it was 
' the abrupt decline in the quant ity of the s e  exports after 
1966 that brought a renewal of balance of payments difficulties 
• •
• ' (Power and Sicat 19 7 1 : 116 ) . More import an t ly ,  there were 
no incentives for s ignificantly altering the indust rializat ion 
pat tern . Any move away from import-dependence and import­
substitut ion would be less profitable t o  the industrialist s  
cum primary exporters  and would thus b e  oppo sed b y  them. 
Even more crucially , such a move would signif icantly alter the 
bas ic s truc ture of the economy and hence involve far-reaching 
changes in the polit ical sys tem .  A brief structural analys is 
of the polity will show why this is so . 
Polit ical structures 
Being unitary , the political system endowed a highly 
centralized formal decis ion-making power in the Presiden cy 
and t he Congress .  Moreover , there was a high degree of 
execut ive and administrative centraliz ation . 
As we have seen in Chapters 3 ,  4 and 5 ,  the lo cal govern­
ments  were given very lit t le authority in resour ce mobilizat ion 
and pub lic expenditure.  With regard to the lat ter , the 
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cen tral government in Manila did not  only exercise power 
through the pervasive nat ional agencies like the departments 
o f  educat ion and public works . The President and the Congress 
actually had considerab le direct control over the nat ional 
funds . The Pres ident was formally empowered to de cide 
personally on the releas e and apport ionment of all non-rout ine 
expenditures . In part icular , with the help o f  the Congress 
he was respon s ib le for the allo cation of the huge development 
fund , popularly known as the pork-·barrel ftmd . He also had 
complete personal discretion over various contingency funds . 
In addition to resource mobilizat ion and expenditure , 
the cen tral government had an overwhelming authority in the 
matter o f  appointment to pub lic offices . Again , much of this 
authority rested with the Pres ident personally . He was 
directly responsible , for example , fo r the appointmen t of 
j udges throughout the count ry . 
It  has often been said that his centralization of 
executive and administ rat ive power was counterb alanced by 
polit ical decentraliz at ion most eviden tly manifested in the 
structure of the two nat ional part ies which have been charac­
terized as ' loose coalit ions or ad hoe alliances of provincial 
leaders who brought their respect ive personal followings with 
them '  ( Corpuz 19 65 : 16 ) . The reality , however , did not really 
admit any b alan cing of polit ics . As we shall see below , it 
would be too s imple to cha racterize the political process as 
being de centralized . The political and governmen tal structures 
were mutually support ive . 
It is t rue that , tmlike most  other tmderdeveloped 
countries , the Philippines was markedly charact erized by the 
exis tence of very powerful provin cial families . By one cotm t 
( S imbulan 19 65 : 2 05 ) , there were 169 o f  these families fotmd 
in every province , whose dominance was based primarily , 
though of course not exclusively , on wealth . Interestingly , 
perhaps the great maj ority o f  them were conn ected with the 
t radit ional exports dis cus sed above . Certainly the owners 
of the large sugar estates , the sugar ' b arons ' in the Visayan 
provin ces were among the most powerful of these provincial 
' oligarchs ' .  Ownership of  large amotmts o f  land was als o  a 
principal factor .  Indeed ,  i t  was fotmd that ' the provinces 
that produced the greates t number of leaders are those that 
have the highest  con cent rat ion of land-ownership ' ( Simbulan 
1965 : 202 ) . 
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Great wealth was essent ial for the accumulat ion and 
exercise of  dominant political power . Perhaps more manifes tly 
and to a greater ext ent than many other Southeast As ians , 
the Filipinos rely on dyadic relationships which emphas iz e 
the satis faction of particularis t ic int erest s .  This situat ion 
allows for the special importance o f  patronage as the basis 
of social status and influen ce . In this way , the dominan t  
provin cial families were the greatest an d  fo remost pat rons 
in their regions . Directly and indirect ly , they were expected 
and ab le to satisfy the part icularist ic demands of  the 
greatest number of  people . On the one hand , they surrotm.ded 
themselves with their principal clients who in turn had their 
own cl ient s ,  and so on . More direct ly ,  they acted as ' patrons 
of b i g  events in the province or in the mtm.icipalit ies , such 
as fiestas , fairs , athlet ic contests , and the like ' (Agpalo 
1972 : 46 ) . Needless to say , this extent of pat ronage required 
a large amotm.t of mat erial resources . In return , of course ,  
the families ob tained the grat itude and loyalty o f  the people 
of  their lo calit ies and thus their deci sive polit ical power . 
In polit i cs ,  the des cen ding layers o f  clients served as their 
enthus ias t ic lieutenants , campaign workers and supporters . 
With the existence o f  wealthy and powerful local group­
ings , the political part ies clearly could not develop into 
centralized and dis ciplined machines . The independence o f  
the provincial leaders ,  however , could b e  easily exaggerated . 
Although they could connnand considerab le res ources and hence 
could no doub t res ist any at tempt to subj ugate them (Lande 
19 65 : 5 ) ,  they did require con siderable help from the centre 
and could not easily defy the top national leaders . Very 
few of the dominant provincial f amilies could be wealthy 
enough to rely en tirely or even largely on their own privat e  
fo rt tm.es for the financing o f  their polit ical act ivit ies .  
The notoriously expens ive electoral campaigns alone would 
be too drainin g  to most of them. Moreover , central authority 
and assist an ce were in several ways not merely desirab le but 
also necessary . Although the re were indeed numerous polit i­
cally profitable commtm.ity proj ect s that local leaders could 
direct ly and privately undert ake or  contribute to , many 
othe rs , especially the mo re spectacular ones such as school 
buildings , connntm.ity halls an d feeder roads , were not only 
too expensive but were also formally public . For such pro­
j ects , formal approval and ftm.d s  had to come from above . 
Similarly , the local leaders had to depend heavily on the 
centre for the satis faction of various especially popular 
demands such as pub lic service appointments and special 
licences and permit s .  
6 7  
Given the overriding power o f  the cent ral government 
under the nat ional leaders , it would o f  course b e  impossible 
for the regional leaders in con trol of  the provin cial and 
lo cal government s  to be very independent .  A provincial 
leader was even more vulnerable if his group did not happen 
to be the clearly dominant fact ion in his province . In such 
a situat ion , his ability and power to manoeuvre was naturally 
more limit e d .  Yet , it is equally very easy to overrate the 
effect ive power of the central governmental and polit ical 
leaders . The case of on e provincial elite des cribed by 
Agpalo illuminates the actual character of the relat ionship 
between the nat ional and regional leaders . Acco rding to him 
(Agpalo 19 72 : 3 73) , 
the polit ical elit e  of Occidental Mindoro are 
vulne rab le to and have be come vict ims of the 
manipulat ion by the national government . Their 
appointments are turned down if they do not 
comply with various requirements , some legal and 
o thers polit ical . The ir pork-barrel funds are 
not released , if certain politi cal cons iderat ions 
are not met . Their reques t s  for budgetary aid 
are taken care o f ,  but they must pay some kind of  
quid pro quo . . .  
On the other hand , they 
also learn how to maneuver to get b et te r  or 
b es t  result s from the nat ional government . 
in turn , manipulate the national o fficials , 
use o f  their support from their polit ical 
bailiwicks . 
the 
They , 
making 
1 
More than anything else , the unique role o f  the Congressman 
had det ermined the st ructure o f  the po lit ical rel at ionship 
between the centre and the provinces . Janus-like , each 
1The Philippine Congress was made up of  two chambe rs : the 
House of Representat ives and the Senate .  The t erm congress­
men , however , usually referred only to the Representat ives 
who numbered 104 j ust b efore the imposit ion o f  the Mart ial 
Law .  Each p rovince had at least one Congressman , depending 
on the size of it s populat ion . The Senators who numb ered 
24 were elected . at large nat ionally . 
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Congressman at on ce was a provincial and a n at ional leader . 
As a represent at ive of  his province , he was def init ely a 
member of the top provinc ial elit e .  In fact , particularly 
in a smal l ,  s ingle-const ituen cy province , he was likely t o  
b e  at leas t as powerful as the governo r o  Indeed , governorship 
and memb ership in congress were very often clo sely linked .  
Although few governors had b een Congressmen , a large number 
of Congressmen had served as governors . It has also b een 
noted ( Corpuz 19 65 : 9 8)  that : 
In the 1950 ' s  and 19 60 ' s  a trend seemed to  be 
shaping up . The husband or wife was a member 
of the Congress ,  the other was the provincial 
governor . 
On the other hand,  as a member of  the most important nat ional 
inst itut ion next to the Pres idency , a Congressman was one of 
fewer than two hun dred most  powerful polit i cal leaders of  
the country . His actual power depended no  doub t on  many 
facto rs including particularly the length of his t enure in 
Congress , the importance o f  his province an d the extent of  
his  dominance in it , and his  parliament ary and party skills . 
In any case , every Con gressman was in a posit ion to  play a 
pe culiarly crucial ro le . Far from being a liab ility , his 
dual membership in the nat ional and regional elites allowed 
him to use his power and influen ce in the nat ional or re gional 
arena to support and augment the same in the o ther .  In so 
doing , he was indispensab le to bo th.  
To the other members o f  the regional elite , the Con gress­
man was the principal source of  b enefits whi ch were ne ces sary 
fo r the maintenance of their own dominance through the sat is­
fact ion of the demands of their followers . Aft er all , the 
Congres sman no t only had a share in the various funds under 
the dire ct and indirect con tro l  of the Congress b ut was able 
to influence the central government agencies which were in 
charge of supplying mo st of the lo cal proj ects and services . 
Since the extent to  whi ch a Con gressman could deliver the 
benefits depended on his own standing in the nat ional elite , 
it was clearly in the int erest of  the regional leaders to  give 
him the ne ces sary support . 
For s imilar reasons , the main memb ers of the nat ional 
elit e ,  the senators and the President and his lieut enants , 
were equally anxious to support the Congressmen . In the 
final analys is , the power of the President  or a Senator  
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depended on the number and comb ined influence of  Con gressmen 
he coul d  count on . This means that the Pres ident or a 
Senato r  would always try to boo s t  the hold o f  their Congres­
sional allies in their respe ct ive provin ces . In effect , he 
would share with them his power and privileges . 
In reality , then , the pol it ical sys tem was simply a 
giant system o f  pat ron- client rel at ionship s ,  reflect ing the 
basi c  pattern of social relations  among the Filipinos .  
Within this sys tem there were nat urally no sharp po ints or 
l ines of conflict betw·een the nat ional and regional leaders . 
It would thus be unj ustifiable to characterize the system 
convent ionally as cen tralized . By the same token , however , 
it would be very easy to overemphas iz e  it s decen tralized 
character . What should be highlighted is the fact that the 
sys tem required a concen t ration of a great deal of resources 
at the centre . Without such con cent rat ion , the system would 
certainly collapse as the nat ional l eaders ,  including the 
Congressmen , could not possib ly perform their crucial role 
as the chief pat rons in the polity . 
Obvio usly ,  the channelling o f  the concentrated  resources 
in the form of pat ronage implied con siderable central 
direction . One reason why the concent rat ion cannot , however , 
be simply called centraliz ation is that the resources could 
no t be  kept at the centre but had to be dist ributed throughout 
th e sys tem.  Furthermore , the cent ral direct ion was also 
essent ially in the in terest of  the regional leaders . As we 
have seen ,  it allowed them to  develop part icularist ic 
relat ionships with the nat ional leaders which they could 
then exploit , also part icularistically , for the sustenance 
of their own lo cal prominence . Paradoxically , therefore , 
centralizat ion promoted decen tral iz at ion .  
The political-economic linkage 
In short , the relat ionship b etween the regional and 
nat ional leaders was that o f  mut ual advant age . Thus it was 
basically the same in character as the parallel relat ionship 
in the economic system,  b etween the import-dependent import­
substituting manufacturers in and around the met ropolit an 
centre and the exporters of  primary products in the regions . 
In both systems ,  this pattern of  int erdependence implied and 
fed upon rural stagnat ion . The owners an d  operators of the 
export-producing estat es and camps were not merely uninterested 
in the development of  agriculture and rural indust rializat ion 
out s ide their enclaves . The con tinuing poverty surrounding 
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them was in fact conducive t o  the maintenan ce of their social 
status and powe r .  Similarly , lo cal apathy or dependen ce ,  
whi ch has b ecome a cliched observat ion among the student s of  
Philippine polit ics , was definitely not  s imply an unfortunate 
state of affairs . After all ,  pat ronage requires not only 
pat rons but also clients . Some o f  the latter may o f  course 
be  also pat rons in turn but the Philippine rural populace , 
being at the bot tom of the patronage line , was s imply and 
necessarily dependent . 
This close parallel between the polity and the e conomy 
is hardly surprising.  The polit ical and e conomic elites 
obviously had strongly complement ary interest s .  S ince they 
depended on special government measures such as tariff pro­
tect ion , low rate o f  interes t an<l over-evaluat ion o f  the 
curren cy ,  th e manufacturers naturally favoured the central­
izat ion of  polit ical power w ith which they could deal con­
veniently and on which they could con cent rate their p ressure . 
On the o ther hand , as they required a lot o f  money whi ch 
they could get hold of  conveniently, the n at ional polit ical 
leaders had a de finite vested interest in supporting concen­
trated , large-s cale industrial ization t ied to s imilarly 
concentrat ed , large-scale p rimary export operat ion . 
More fundamentally , the polit ical an d  economic systems 
were necess arily parallel b ecause their elites were inext ric­
ably enmeshe d .  The great regional families not only dominated 
both the economi c and politi cal life in the regions but to a 
cons iderable extent cons t it uted the national el it e  as wel l .  
In the fin al analysis , t h e  e'xport o f  primary an d  semi­
pro cessed pro duct s and the import-substit ution manufacturing 
were two complementary act ivit ies of the same group which 
was , moreover , closely linked with the lar ge landlords . 
Together these two groups supplied the main nation al polit ical 
leaders who had to be , and invariably were ,  t he wealthiest 
c it izens of  the country . Of course these interlo cking t ies 
were not always blatant . As usual , higher educat ion and 
pro fessional attainment provided both the mediating cover 
and the reinforcing mechanism .  All prominent regional 
families maintained residence in Met ropolit an Manila where 
their sons  and daughters could fully utilize their obvious 
advant ages to dominate the mos t  prestigious educat ional 
in stitut ions and professions . The powerful were not only 
wealthy b ut also generally very well educat ed and pro fess ion­
ally s uccess ful . 
Epilogue 
From the findings and arguments of the main chapters 
of  thi s study , two overriding conclus ions should stand out : 
(a) that the fun damen tal problem of developmen t in the Philip­
pines - rural stagnation - is truly mas sive , and (b ) that 
the solut ion of this problem would require bas ic and far­
reaching overhaul of the closely enmeshed economic and poli­
t ical systems . The first is hardly surprising and is beyond 
dispute . Unfortunately , the se cond has not b een properly 
ackr1owledged.  At least , it has never been unambiguous ly 
formulated and hen ce squarely faced by local as well as 
foreign students of the economy and pol it ics of the Philippines . 
Re flect ing the prevailing ideolo gy! and convent ional pre­
occupat ion of their respect ive dis ciplines these economis ts  
and polit is ts  have generally pursued their analysis well 
short of the poin t  where the necessary connection between 
polit ics and economics would be revealed . To a significant 
extent this l imitat ion seems to b e  int entional , dictat ed by 
both caut ion an d  the des ire to be const ruct ive . 2 
A very goo d  example o f  the es sent ial t imidity o f  even 
the polit ically sensit ive economist s  is well displayed in 
Sharing in Deve lopment ,  the ILO study already cited several 
t imes in the last chapter . Finan ced by the Unit ed Nations 
Development Programme , the report was apparently endorsed 
by the New Society adminis trat ion . 
Correctly identifying the fundamental economic problem, 
the report firmly argues fo r a sharp shift ' from a narrow 
11 have identified this ideolo gy as bas ically l iberal 
(Nawawi 1976b ) . 
2The mo st succinct fo rmulation I have heard of what is con­
st ructive was given by Dr Goh Keng Swee , the Deputy Prime 
Minister of Singapore , to a group of my political s cien ce 
students at the University of Singapore in 19 72 . He said 
that to b e  const ructive an analyst should (a) only cons ider 
the ' how ' and not the 'why ' of policies and (b ) should 
balance each critical ob servat ion with at least two declar­
at ions of praise .  This rule of thumb is certainly endorsed 
by all governments in Southeast Asia . 
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emphasis on lar ge-scale industry fuelled by tradit ional 
export s  towards a broadened development path which would 
invo lve the neglect ed sectors of  foo d pro ducing agriculture 
and medium and small-s cale industry ' (p . xxiii) . Specifically , 
it recommends a ' two-pron ged st rat egy : ( a) the balanced 
mob ilization of the rural secto r ,  in order to provide employ­
ment opportunities for the people in the preponderant rural 
areas of the Philipp ines and to generate the rural surplus , 
used directly or indirectly , to support future urban indust rial 
growth ; and (b ) the divers ificat ion of exports t owards new 
lab or-intensive indust rial goods , in order to ensure that 
the urb an  indus trial sector is it self in a position to help 
to fuel its own future development rather thau to cont inue 
to have to depend exclus ively on the rural sector ' (p . xxv) . 
In even more concrete terms , the report goes on to 
specify (on the same page)  that : 
With respect to  the balanced mob iliz at ion o f  the 
rural sector [ the emphas is should be ] on the need 
for credit and land reform, for sub stantial govern­
men t decen tral izat ion to the sub-mun icipal level , 
and fo r sustained effort s in irrigat ion , electri­
f ication and other infra-struct ural investments . 
With respect to the indust rial export drive • • •  
recommendat ions center on makin g it eas ier for 
hitherto n eglected medium- and small-scale indus­
tries to play an increas ing part , and on gradually 
dismantling the protective environment that now 
inhib it s substan t ial Philipp ine exp ans ion into  
world market s on the basis of  the comb inat ion of  
her  plent iful supply of high-quality labor with 
her relat ively strong and increasingly experienced 
entrepreneurial capacity . 
To it s credit , the study vividly defines ' balanced rural 
mob iliz ation ' as (p . 2 9 ) : 
The simultaneous growth o f  primary and secondary 
food product ion and of  rural industry and services 
in a mutually reinforcing, self-feeding fashion . 
1-t is a mushrooming exchange of  foo d grains , 
ve get ables and poultry ,  on the on e s ide , and pumps , 
implements , shoes and shirt s , on the other , with 
the s imultaneous generat ion o f  incomes  and 
reciprocal market s .  Thi s  mushrooming act ivity , 
with it s generat ion of product ive employmen t 
and output gains in a large numb er of small 
places , is not conf ined to an interchange of  
product ivity between a town and it s rural 
hint erland but in cludes production and trading 
act ivities among the islands and between smaller 
t owns and the intermediate-level urban growth 
poles , as well as enhanced output-generat ing 
activity within a ba:Prio itself . 
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At a glance , the above prescript ions appear to be both 
reason able and comprehensive . On re flect ion , however , they 
in fact prove to b e  narrow and quite naive . 
In the f irst  place , they have failed to t ake into 
account the polit ical will to implement them. To be taken 
seriously , the basic s t rategy suggested above must at least 
acknowledge the fact that it runs directly counter to the 
interlo cking economic and polit ical int erests of the dominant 
nat ional cum regional elite . As has been pointed out in the 
preceding chapter , the import-sub st itut ing import-dependent 
industrializ ation was both very convenien t  and highly profit­
ab le to the elite . We have also seen that the administrative 
cent ralizat ion was an integral element o f  the polit ical­
e conomic system. Hence , the recommended shift to industrial­
izat ion for export and significant decent raliz at ion would be 
st rongly opposed.  
Even if the elite could be persuaded or  fo rced to desist 
from opposing them, the des ired changes would not necessarily 
come about . After all , there is no reason to expect that 
capital woul d rush into  the new export act ivity or the many , 
presumably compet ing , new medium- or small-s cale industries . 
Similarly it is  di ffi cult to imagine that the lo cal communi­
t ies , especially the ba:Prios , would by themselves spring to 
lively dynamism as envisaged . As the report it self admits  
(p . 6 7 ) , each level of local government 
shows the effects of  its traditional role as the 
implementor of policy from above , the locus of 
polit ical pat ronage from above , and the seeker of 
largesse from above . Not surprisingly , each has 
lacked both local initiat ive and lo cal capacity 
• . .  Each mtm icipality has its center -- the 
pob lacion -- dominated by lo cal medium-siz e  land­
owners and other relatively well-off c it izens 
whose int erests  are not those  of  the barrio people . 
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It would seem, then , that at  the very least the recom­
mended strategy calls for an activist cent ral governmen t ,  
ab le and resolved to propel the new indus trializat ion and 
fire the confidence and in itiative of the rural populace . 
Leaving aside the quest ion how it could possib ly emerge 
without the appearance of a new polit ical elite , we should 
expect such governmen t to require ample resources . It is 
debatab le , of course , whether the amoun t would actually b e  
larger or smaller than that availab le t o  the old regime . 
But in any case the report should have indi cat ed how the 
necessary resources could be obt aine d .  Obviously i t  would 
be unreasonable to expect them to b e  forthcoming from the 
tradit ional exporters cum industrialists . 
Considering the fact that the report was more or les s 
officially spon sored by the government , it s failure to push 
its analys is further could perhap s be seen as purely tact ical . 
If the implicat ions of the advocated strategy were unmistak­
ab le , it would of  course be s illy to state them openly and 
thereby risk incurring certain of f i cial displeasure . However , 
the implicat ions  do need to be spelled out more unamb iguously 
before they can be suffi cien t ly evident . 
What seems to be a more reasonab le int erpretat ion of  
the ab ove shor tcomin gs o f  the report is that the  authors are 
simply amb ivalent . They must be aware of the pos s ib le 
implicat ions but are unwillin g ,  b as ically for ideolo gical 
reasons , to make them mor e  explicit . Indeed , they seem to 
want to cling to th e fundament al liberal propo s it ion that 
all that is n eeded for economic development is the removal 
of t e chnical or administ rat ive barriers . Renea the removal 
of pro t ect ion would be , in their view , quite adequate for 
the s t imul at ion o f  industrial export . With resp ect to  rural 
mob ilizat ion whi ch they regarded as ' clearly the more 
difficult , and thus the more crit ical ' (p . 2 8 ) , they s imply 
maintain that (p . 30) 
the main difficulty in the way of generat ing an 
in ternally balanced growth pat tern within and 
among the maj or islands result s from organizat ional 
problems . . .  What is needed , we b elieve , is a n ew 
comb inat ion o f  t ruly lo cal public sector decision­
making as regards what is to be done , with a 
greater emphasis on the Government ' s  efficient 
response as regards h<JU? to do it ( emphas is original) .  
Interestingly , this amb ivalence seems to parallel or  
reflect th e amb ivalence of the leaders of the New Society 
themselves . To really appreciate the latter , it would be 
necess ary to examine carefully the re cord of  achievemen ts 
and failures of the Marcos regime in the last six years . 3 
Such examinat ion , however ,  is b eyond the intent ion of  the 
present study . 
75  
3For a preliminary assessment of  the f irst two y ears of the 
martial law admin i st rat ion , see Nawawi (19 7 5 ) . 
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